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PREFACE
Our subject is the behavior of man, not of some
imaginary "ideal" man or of some equally hypothetical
and non-existent "average" man, but of man as he really
lives and acts, with all his weaknesses and limitations.
It is these real actions of real men which are the
relevant subject matter of economic inquiry which has
as its aim the comprehension of human action.

In this

sense, we seek in this study to establish what investing
persons are about.

Herein we envisage a system which,

perhaps with unbecoming immodesty, purports to describe
the behavior of men as they engage in the processes of
appraising, evaluating and selecting among alternative
security investments.
As always, what we have written and rewritten with
such pains is, in retrospect, less than perfect, even to
our biased eyes.

There comes a time, however, when one

must stop revising and conclude, for now.

But one hopes

that such readers as one has will recognize that one's
conclusions are "for now," that what one says is tentative,
and that one's most recent position, however positively
stated, need not be one's permanent position, that in the
final analysis, only change is permanent.
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Also, in retrospect one must be Impressed by the
extent to which he has been influenced by friends and
mentors, near and far.

In our case this must be especially

so, for we have held throughout that whatever "fields" of
knowledge may exist, boundaries do not; that disciplines
are mere adjuncts to the division of academic labor.

Our

intention has been to take what is for us a "world-view"
and to draw together the behavioral foundations of invest
ment decision-making by individuals.

Our indebtedness is

accordingly considerable and diffuse.

Where our thoughts

have definite and traceable origins, we have endeavored
to acknowledge our indebtedness directly, and in many cases
we have found it desirable to support our arguments with
the statements of others.

In such cases we have endeavored

to ensure that the reported views are authoritative ones
and that they have not been misconstrued, though we must
admit the possibility remains.
Finally, we have many personal friends from contact
with whom we have benefitted and to whom we are indebted.
Any attempt to pay specific tribute would, however, be
incomplete and therefore inappropriate.

Also, our

permanent committee, consisting of Professors
Donald E. Vaughn (Chairman), William J. Stober,
P. Francis Boyer, Edmund R. Gray, and Lloyd F. Morrison,
read and commented incisively upon prior drafts and the
completed dissertation.
sincere appreciation.

To each of these is expressed our
Let it be noted, however, that our

ill

use of the first person plural throughout is entirely
stylistic.

In every case the interpretations and

final Judgments have been our own.

We acknowledge our

indebtedness to all, but we alone accept responsibility
for any errors of omission or commission.
Ronald G. E. Smith
Louisiana State University
August, 1968
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ABSTRACT
We seek in this study a comprehension of what
investing persons are about.

In particular, we outline

a broad theoretical system which purports to describe the
behavior of real men as they engage in the processes of
appraising, evaluating, and selecting among alternative
security investments.
We argue:
(1) At any time the individual Investor has a
fixed stock of (net) cashable (Invested and Investible)
wealth.
(2) The investment opportunities of persons are
represented by risky securities and (practically) riskless
(money-wise) cash.
(3) The investment choices of persons are made in a
given present in respect of an uncertain future.
(4) All knowledge of the future and, therefore, of
the future consequences of investment choices is held with
only a greater or lesser degree of probability.
(5) Investment choice and action are individual and
here and now, involving appraisement, the anticipation of
the expected consequences of available alternative invest
ments, and valuation, the preference of an individual

viii

Investor for the appraised consequences of alternatives.
(6 ) The investment decisions of persons are made
relevant to some (short) period of time, or "investment
horizon."
(7) The (net) ex post monetary gain or loss on an
investment is the (net) market price of the investment at
the end of the investment horizon plus (net) periodical
income (if any) from the investment over the horizon
minus the (gross) purchase price of the investment.
(8 ) The subjective expectations (appraisements) of
persons concerning the (net) income and capital gain
prospects of alternative investments subsist as
n-parameter (subjective) probability distributions over
envisioned possible future events, ex ante monetary gains
and losses on alternative Investments over specified
investment periods.
(9) The individual investor entertains probabilistic
appraisements for a finite set of alternative investments.
(10) The Individual investor’s utility of wealth
function is generally of the form specified by FriedmanSavage and modified by Markowitz: concave (from below) for
a relevant range of losses in wealth, convex over some
relevant range of gains in wealth, then concave again, but
bounded in the extremes.
(11) The investor selects among alternative invest
ments so as to maximize his present valuation of net
expected utility.

ix

We infer:
(i) The investment valuations of individuals are
determined as preferences for strictly limited commitments
in particular securities at current (or appraised) prices.
The private inclinations of Investors to action in respect
of a security (to buy, to sell, or to hold specific
quantities at specific prices) then have effect in the
market.

They collectively determine between more or less

narrow margins the price and quantity of each (dated)
market transaction.
(ii)

The market prices of securities derive from the

interaction of the subjective judgments of all participants
in the market and are objective measurements.

They measure

at a given time and place the number of monetary units
which could have been substituted for a given quantity of
securities, and vice-versa.

(Dated) prices and trans

action volume alone constitute the corroborative data
of securities markets and require to be regarded as the
output of a "black boy."
(ill) The Inputs of the securities markets are
informational stimuli only variously received and
vicariously interpreted.

Important inputs through time

of such markets are their output data: the past and
present prices of securities as indications of future
prices, as objective criteria by which the effectiveness
of past investment choices may be Judged, and by reference
to which investors may ascertain the current monetary

x

equivalents of their portfolios as indications of their
present capacities for action.
(iv) The market in securities is a viable social
system; security prices are social phenomena.

The market

for any security with its price mechanism is a homeostatic
system.

The forces determining the state of the market at

any moment are entirely the value Judgments of rational
persons, based always upon the most current expectations
and valuations of all investing persons.

xl

CHAPTER I
UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION AND INVESTMENT
1.

Introduction

The choice to hold assets, or stocks of things
with exchange value, is the obverse of the choice to con
sume, since a person who holds valuable assets can always
(choose to) consume them directly or sell them and commit
the proceeds to consumption.

The economic choices of an

individual concern the allocation of his wealth, measured
by the cash value of the assets he holds,

between con-

^"The significant concept and measure of wealth in
a market economy is the monetary equivalent, or the sum
of money prices if sold of all severable things owned.”
Raymond J. Chambers, Accounting, Evaluation and Economic
Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1^66), p. 70. Considered in this way, the concept of
wealth excludes any measure of the skills and potenti
al! tie s“emBo3Ted in persons. At any point of time these
have not been delivered and may never be delivered. It
is acknowledged that the sale of personal services in the
market represents the major source of personal Income
from which wealth may be accumulated. But "the market
ordinarily does not buy a man's potential; it buys his
services, as his potential becomes an actuality." Ibid.,
p. 10Jf. Such a conception of wealth also rejects tRe
(mistaken) idea that persons can spend their future
incomes. This notion postulates an impossibility and
cannot be accepted. People can (and do) borrow money
on the security of their future earnings, but selling
a claim based on one's earning capacity is fundamentally
like selling any other asset or claim against an asset.
The saleability of mortgages and IOU's generally requires
a market. The constraint on one's capacity to act
financed by the sale of IOU's is to be found in the
1

2
sumption spending and the holding of assets through
time.

For simplicity and consistent with the Keynesian

view that consumption spending is financed out of current
Income, we consider the acquisition of assets intended
for consumption as tantamount to the act of consumption
and regard the asset holdings of persons as holdings of
2
3
risky securities and riskless cash.-'
market for debts, where the
established. See Samuel B.
Economic Analysis (Berkeley
of California Press, 1963)*

prices of such assets are
Chase, Asset Prices in
and Los Angeles: University
pp. 4-7.

^We define securities broadly to include stocks,
bonds, notes, and perhaps most commonly, deeds to real
property and chattels.
"Conceived in its larger sense,
investment includes a far broader field than the layman
supposes. It is less of stocks and bonds, and more of
land, buildings, insurance policies and annuities; it is
less of accounting statistics and more of economic prin
ciples." Floyd F. Burtchett, Investments and Investment
Policy (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, l£3B), P» 5*
’’’Depending on his own status, needs and tastes, the thing
purchased as an investment may be marketable securities,
life insurance, savings deposits, other titles or claims,
Including land, or blocks of producers* goods or other
commodities; may be either newly created or long in
existence; and may constitute either a net expansion of
his investment assets or merely a replacement of other
assets previously held. From the individual*s point of
view, all are ‘investment.*" James W. Angell, "Uncertainty,
Likelihoods and Investment Decisions," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, LXXIV, No. 1 (February, I960),
Solely for
convenience, we shall usually refer to the investments of
persons as (long or short) commitments in the securities
of firms. The analysis is, however, quite general.
-'The risklessness of cash holdings to which we refer
is in respect of the number of units of cash held. The
implication intended is that so many monetary units today
will be the same number of monetary units tomorrow. This
concept of risklessness in money terms is to be distin
guished clearly from the risk of loss due to changes in
the purchasing power of money, i.e., in real terms. For
simplicity, we regard holdings of cash, near-money assets
(e.g., deposits in insured savings accounts), and (actual

Accordingly, the investment decisions of persons
involve the allocation of an individual's cashable wealth
among alternative securities with different (and uncertain)
income and capital gain prospects and investment holdings
A
of riskless cash.
We speak of the securities and specu
lative cash holdings of a person as his Investment port
folio and of the process by which he makes asset choices
as portfolio selection.

In this dissertation we investi

gate the way in which individuals appraise, evaluate and
choose among alternative security investments and thereby
determine the market prices of securities.
2.

Uncertainty, Appraisement and Valuation

It is customary to speak of the investment decisions
of persons as examples of decision-making under uncertainty.
Nonetheless, as uncertainty Implies a general incomplete
ness of knowledge, it is in fact a condition of action
generally,^ for it will be clear that choice and action
or guaranteed) obligations of the government and its
agencies as money holdings and riskless in money terms.
L
Investment, or "speculative,” holdings of cash
denote money balances in excess of those balances neces
sary to consumption transactions. The speculative
balances of persons will include, therefore, money held
as a precaution against the unforeseen and in the antici
pation of changes in the rate at which money can be
exchanged for other assets, including securities. On the
incentives to hold money and liquidity preference, see
John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment.
Interest and Money (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1942),
Chps. 13 and 1^.
'’"The uncertainty of the future is already implied
in the very notion of action. That man acts and that the

(investment and otherwise) are characteristically present
processes.^

One decides and acts in the here and now,

but the consequences (intended and otherwise) of action
are characteristically future and the evaluation of the
effectiveness of action is characteristically past.
Alternatively stated, the process of choice, itself
present, represents the selection of a specific course
of action having future consequences; and, though one
may know much about the present and the past considered
relevant for the future, (clairvoyants notwithstanding)
one may know nothing with certainty about the future.
Antecedent to the valuation and selection of any specific
action, if the choice among alternatives is to be other
than random, an actor will require to appraise the
expected future consequences of alternative courses of
action.
Though the two are closely related, the process
of appraisement is to be distinguished in important
respects from that of valuation.

Appraisement in no

way depends upon the preferences and values of the
future is uncertain are by no means two independent
matters. They are only two different modes of establishing
the same thing." Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (3d rev.
ed.; Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966), p. 105.
^"Valuation is an essentially’present*process arising
out of the opinions, beliefs and sentiments of the owners
of physical capital (including money) operating on the
various forms of physical capital actually in existence
at the moment of valuation." Kenneth E. Boulding,
A Reconstruction of Economics (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1950), p.

5
appraising individual.

Appraisement denotes the antici

pation of an expected fact: a future dividend or interest
payment or a future market price, for example.

Valuation,

on the other hand, subsists in the preferences of an
individual for the appraised future consequences of
alternative actions.

Valuation, while a necessary part

of reasoned choice, is therefore always subjective and
entirely personal; it is expressive of an order of
preference and not of measure.

It ranks or arranges

in a scale of degrees which knows only the ordinal
7
numbers.1
It will be quite clear that valuation as a process
is directed towards the future.

What we evaluate is

always the expected, "a state of affairs to be brought
into existence, never a thing or state of affairs which
O
now exists."
Value is attributed to the non-existent,
o
never to the existent.
Moreover, valuation's are
?von Mises, ojo. clt., p. 97; "Every valuation is a
comparison; we have no conception of an absolute utility
or an absolute standard of utility. The notion of value
is meaningless except in relation to alternatives of
choice." Prank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19^0), p. 63; "The
predication of 'goodness' may be simply positive, but
the predication of value (valuation) must always be
comparative, x is 'good'; but x has 'more (or less) or
higher (or lower) value' than jr." W. D. Lamont, The
Value Judgment (Edinburgh: The Edinburgh University Press,
19357, P. 59.
8Ibib., p. 60.
9
"If I have a stock of wood sufficient to make a
bookcase or a table, but not both, the choice is between
non-existents, the potential bookcase and the potential

6
transient.

They are conceived by a given Individual at

a given time and in a given action situation, and the
environment of action is flux.
3.

10

*

11

The Meaning of Probability

Because the future is uncertain, it is incontro
vertible that all knowledge about the future consequences
of actions is held with only a greater or lesser degree
12
of probability, never with certainty.
The view we
table.
If I have an actually existing table, and am con
sidering whether to make a bookcase out of it, the things
evaluated against each other are not an existing table
and a potential bookcase, but the potential continuance
of the table and the creation of the bookcase— again two
non-existents.... When we consider carefully what it is
that we are evaluating, we find that what we place in the
valuational order, the alternatives between which we
choose, are potential states of affairs...and not actual
existents." Ibid., p. 6l .
■^"...valuations are always temporal. Any valuation
is limited in time and context; it is made by a person in
a given state, at a given time, and in a given environment.
A valuation is an incident in a continuing stream of
experiences and actions. It has no permanence; it may
never recur.*' Chambers, 0£. cit., p. 42.
H-The several senses in which the terms "valuation”
and "value" are used commonly has caused us some diffi
culty. We use "valuation" generally and "value"
occasionally in the ordinal, subjective sense Just
specified. Value used in this sense is not to be con
fused with mathematical or monetary value; valuation,
not with economic calculation in terms of money. We
shall have occasion to avail ourselves of the latter
uses presently. The sense intended will be apparent
from the context; however, when it is appropriate we may
include a qualifying word. For example, when the former
sense is implied, we may refer to "subjective value;"
when the latter, "monetary value."
1?
‘•This is so even in the case of physical phenomena.
Thus, "no one observing a book lying on a desk would
expect to see it fly up to the ceiling as it experienced

7
adopt of probability is a world-view which regards a
proposition as necessarily "probable" if our knowledge
concerning its content is less than perfect.

13

We are

therefore not able to acknowledge the proposition as
either true or not true.

But we do have some knowledge

concerning the content of the proposition.

We lack

perfect knowledge, but neither are we perfectly Ignorant
about it.
Accordingly, we enumerate two entirely different
instances of probability: class (or frequency) probability
Inl
and case (or subjective) probability.
Class probability
means:

We know, or assume to know, with regard to the

situation concerned, everything about a class of events
or phenomena; we know, or assume to know, on the basis of
repetitive performances of an experiment on different but
a sudden chill. Yet it is not impossible to imagine a
situation in which all the molecules in the book moved
spontaneously in a given direction. Such a situation is
only extremely Improbable, since there are so many
molecules in any macroscopic portion of matter."
Walter J. Moore, Physical Chemistry (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955)» P» 1^5* see also Edward Kasner
and James R. Newman, "New Names for Old," The World of
Mathematics, III (ed. James R. Newman; New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1956), pp. 1996-2010.
13'*The problem of probable Inference is much bigger
than those problems which constitute the field of the
calculus of probability. Only preoccupation with the
mathematical treatment could result in the prejudice that
probability always means frequency." von Mises, op. cit.,
p. 107.
^ T h e designations class and case are due to von Mises,
ibid., pp. 106-115. The concept of case probability has
been variously discussed as "personal probability," "sub
jective probability," "psychological probability," "degree
of conviction," "degree of belief," and "probability belief."

comparable persons or things, the relative frequency
of each outcome; but about an actual, singular experi
ment or event we know nothing but that it is an element
of a class.

Mortality tables, as an example, purport

to tell us everything about the mortality of the whole
population in question.

But they can tell us nothing

about the life expectancy of any single member of this
class of people.

The characteristic feature of insurors

and casinos is that they deal with a whole class of
events.

As they pretend to know everything about the

behavior of a whole class of events they are able to
establish premiums and odds which preclude any specific
risk in the conduct of their business.1^
In contrast to class probability, case probability
means: In respect of a particular event, we know some of
the factors conditioning its outcome; but there are, or
may be, other determining factors about which we know
nothing.

It is this category of probability which has

relevance in problems of human action where any reference
to frequency is inappropriate because our statements
always deal with unique events which are not members of
*5gome writers would restrict the use of the term
"risk" to situations of this sort.
"To qualify as a
risk situation...an experiment must be repetitive in
nature and must possess a frequency distribution from
which observations can be drawn and about which Inferences
can be made by objective, statistical procedures."
Donald E. Farrar, The Investment Decision Under
Uncertainty (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1962;, p. 2; see also Knight, 0£. cit. We make
no such restriction.

9
any class.

16

Case probabilities arise from the knowledge

and experience of the individual and exist essentially as
17
"wagers” about the future. '

Hence, individuals enter

tain for unique events statements of the following kind:
(a) I will bet five to one that Corporation
W reports a loss for the current quarter;
(b) It is my guess that the earnings of
Corporation X will grow at an annual
rate of twenty percent over the next five
years;
(c) I estimate the chances of Corporation Y
common selling at 40, 45, or 50 six months
from now at two-fifths, one-fifth, and
two-fifths, respectively; and
^•^"Uncertainty... is said to be present when the
experiment in question cannot be carefully replicated by
(or upon) other persons or at other times or places; that
is, when the situation is unique. Its frequency distribu
tion, therefore, cannot be objectively specified. This is
undoubtedly the setting in which most Investment decisions
take place." Farrar, loc. clt.; "No two acts of invest
ment sire or can be completely identical; each is unique.
Even when the external form of successive investments is
much the same, as in replacing standard types of inventory
or in making successive purchases of bonds of the same
issue, the surrounding general economic conditions and
prospects are never twice alike, at least in a private
enterprise economy." Angell, o£. clt., p. 4.
^■7"Any statement concerning the future is uttered in
the sense of a wager.... It is the desire for action which
necessitates this gambling. The passive man might sit and
wait for what will happen. The active man who wants to
determine his own future...is obliged to be a gambler
because logic offers him no better way to deal with the
future." Hans Relchenbach, Experience and Prediction
(Chicago: The University of dhlcago Press, i96i),
PP. 315-316.

10
(d) I am certain that Corporation Z (say,
General Motors) will not pass its next
quarterly preferred dividend.
Each of these statements is an example of case probability
as a means by which persons conceptualize the uncertainty
of the future, a means by which persons deal with unique
and individual actions and events.

Each is a subjective

judgment expressing personal conviction, nothing more and
nothing less.

In this respect, statement (d) deserves

additional consideration as an apparent contradiction to
the previously argued inevitable uncertainty of the future.
The apparent contradiction arises from the fact that state
ment (d) is an Inexact expression of opinion.

The person

making such a statement would undoubtedly admit, under
question, that, he is less certain that Corporation Z will
not pass its preferred dividend than he is that the sun
will rise tomorrow.

A more exact formulation would have

been:

I personally am convinced that Corporation Z will
18
not pass its next quarterly preferred dividend.
4.

The 'Investment Horizon'

We may expect general assent to the proposition
that business firms and the securities of firms differ in
their basic characters and, because the future is uncer
tain, in their potentials.

Different securities involve

different rights and claims; different firms produce
1 ft

von Mises, 0£. cit., pp. 106-115.

11
different products and services with varlng degrees of
effectiveness and efficiency.

Prom the point of view of

the investor, however, what is produced by investments in
the securities of firms is money: dividends, interest
payments, and gains on the maturity or sale of securities.
Investors therefore do not prefer an investment in a
supermarket to an investment in an aerospace firm on the
basis that food is "more important" than air travel or
the exploration of space, or on any other non-financial
ground.

Each investor may take into account the different

characteristics of the several classes of securities (and
firms), but only for the purpose of discovering that class,
or within a class of securities, for discovering that firm
which is expected to best serve his investment ends.

19

Because what is produced by investments’ of persons
in the securities of firms is money at future times and
because the potential of any investment to produce money
over an uncertain future is capable only of appraisement,
an investor’s valuation of a security will depend upon
his structure of preferences for the appraised prospects
of alternative investments.

Investment valuation will

require therefore that he appraise with reasonable
■ ^ C h a m b e r s , o£. clt., p. 279; "Some economic institu
tions (and some classes of firms) appeal to one [investor],
some to the other. There is a fair presumption that holders
of American Telephone and Telegraph shares and of British
investment trusts are looking for security and want con
servative administration; while holders of American invest
ment trusts and mining shares want 'a run for their money.*"
A.G. Hart, Anticipations, Uncertainty, and Dynamic Planning
(Chicago: The University of* tihicago Press, 19^0), p. 73*
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precision the expected, monetary consequences of commit
ments of his wealth to alternative Investments.

Further

more, because the investment commitments of persons in the
securities of firms are revocable, investing persons will
ordinarily structure their expectations of the potentials
of alternative investment commitments over some more or
less specified period of time.

In the commonplace this

period is termed the rtinvestment horizon."

20

Now, the

choice of any particular investment horizon is made in
respect of personal investment ends and in the contem
plation of an uncertain future.

But because the ends of

persons are transient and the environment is fluid and
because the reliable bases of reasoned expectations
become more and more vague as one conceives of the farther
distant future,

?1

persons contemplating commitments of

funds to investment securities will, in general, envision
2®J. Tinbergen, "The Notions of Horizon and Expect
ancy in Dynamic Economics," Econometrica, I (July, 1932),

2^7-264.
21"...given knowledge of the present structure or
state of the environment, an expectation in respect of any
time in the immediate future is more dependable than an
expectation in respect of distant future time." Chambers,
op. clt., p. 62; "Investment based on genuine long-term
expectation is so difficult today as to be scarcely prac
ticable.... It needs more intelligence to defeat the
forces of time and our ignorance of the future than to
beat the gun." Keynes, cm. clt., p. 157* "...detailed
estimation and planning for dates beyond the very nearest
future is likely to be wasted effort. Even the course of
events considered 'most probable* will almost certainly
diverge so from reality that all details of plans based
on it will have to be re-worked. It is better economy
to lay out only the broad outlines of estimates and plans
for the distant future...." Hart, oj>. clt., p. 82.
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a relatively short expectancy horizon and will frequently
re-evaluate their various investment commitments in the
light of new information and (perhaps) new expectations
and ends
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It may be objected that persons are observed to
maintain specific investment commitments over substantial
periods of time.

This observation is, however, entirely

consistent with the above conclusion.

We do not require

that the investment holdings of persons be liquidated
periodically.

We conclude merely that these holdings

require periodical cognizance, however casual.

Now, one

may, on such occasions, decide to retain, to increase, or
to liquidate a position.

A series of short-term "retain”

decisions in respect of some commitment then represents
to an observer a "long-term" or "permanent" investment;
but, clearly, to hold a security over time and through
changing conditions is to choose to do so, at least
23
periodically.
YV
his ‘economic
horizo:
w
_ an absolute limit to
his vision. Rather, there is a haze which obscures things
more and more as they become more remote, but through
which the larger features of the distant landscape can
yet be made out...." Hart, loc. clt.
23"por to do nothing and to be idle are also action,
they too determine the course of events. Wherever the
conditions for human interference are present, man acts no
matter whether he interferes or refrains from interfering.
He who endures what he could change acts no less than he
who interferes in order to attain another result."
von Mises, 0£. clt., p. 13 ; "Adaptation is action here and
now. A state of adaptation in the long run is the conse
quence perhaps of a series of actions taken at various

5.

Economic Calculation, Expectations
and Investment

Generally, then, when a man purchases a security
he buys the right to a series of future monetary returns;
in particular, he buys a claim to the future dividend or
interest payments to the security and to the proceeds of
its eventual sale or maturity.

As to the amounts and

timings of such future monetary returns he can only spec
ulate on the basis of his limited current knowledge and
(subjective) beliefs and expectations.

And it is beyond

argument that the propositions one may develop about
future conditions and events are always and inevitably
hypotheticals.

One may use past experience and present

knowledge of facts and relationships in making calculations
and in forming propositions about the future, but those
propositions are beliefs or expectations only.

In

arriving at forecasts or estimates about the future, one
may employ current conditions and the direction in which,
and the rate at which, conditions have changed in the past.
One may take into account also the extent to which observed
trends are expected to be modified in the future.

But

trends and relationships are observed to change, and their
moments of time. But every such action is taken in the
context of a specific here and now." Chambers, 0£. clt.,
p. 205; "There ain’t [sic] no such animal as a permanent
investment." Bernard M. Baruch, quoted in How to Invest
(New York: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smi'thT inc.,
196*), p. 13.
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Implications for the future are matters of opinion and
diverse interpretation.2^

This does not, of course, mean

that calculations about the future are useless.
in fact a necessary part of reasoned choice.

They are

But all that

can result from them as inferences and expectations are
individual and hypothetical.^5
Again, expectations of the future subsist in beliefs
and opinions which coexist in the here and now with one’s
conceptions and values generally and arise from delibera
tion in the light of one’s knowledge and current condition.
With one’s utility for variously uncertain prospects of
money in various amounts and at various times, they com
prise the criteria of investment valuation.
subjective and transient.

But they are

They are an Incident in a con

tinuing stream of consciousness, continually influenced
by the diversity of forces to which an actor himself is
2^"In forecasting by extrapolation, unfortunately,
there is no golden rule.
Instead, we have three basic
assumptions, which may be applied in an infinite number of
combinations: (a) that the recent level of the variable
under study will continue; (b) that the recent rate of
change will continue— an assumption which admits of vari
ants, as we may consider the significant rate of change to
be either the rate of growth or the rate of acceleration,
or some higher derivative; and (c) that the variable will
tend toward some level thought of as ’normal.' These three
assumptions, curiously and wonderfully mixed, lie at the
root of most forecasts....
But while all three rules may
agree as to the direction of the revision, they will not
agree as to the distance it will extend into the future,
or as to intensity." Hart, ojd. cit., p. 78.
25"Llfe, in fact, is an hypothecating process."
G. Patrick Meredith, "The Surprise Function and the Epistemic Theory of Expectations." Expectations, Uncertainty,
and Business Behavior (ed. Mary Jean Bowman; New York:
Social Science Research Council, 1958), p. 75.
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subject.

They are a product of his-perceptions.

6.

Information and Investment

As the future Is uncertain, It will be clear that
the conscious choices of persons involving future conse
quences will be predicated upon expectations.

It will be

clear, too, that the expectations of persons derive from
the beliefs and interpretations of individual actors.
This remains so independent of whether one is about
choosing the shortest distance between two points or
appraising the price at which some stock will sell at some
future date.

The fact that geometry provides an undis

puted answer in the first case and that no such answer
is possible in the second case does not alter this prop
osition.

In either case the decision of an individual

depends upon his state of mind or knowledge at the time.
Expectation, therefore, is simply the current state of
mind of a given individual with respect to an assertion,
a coming event, or any other matter on which absolute
26
knowledge is unavailable.
Since the environment in
which man exists and acts is one of permanent change,
an individual's knowledge and state of mind, and there
fore his expectations, may be expected to continually
alter as he receives and interprets new stimuli— messages,
objects, and events newly apprehended.

Not all of these

2^After De Morgan's definition of probability,
quoted in Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, "The Nature of Expec
tation and Uncertainty," ibid., p. 12.

stimuli will have definable effects upon the expectations
of a recipient.

We term the set of stimuli, among the

many to which an actor is continually subject, which have
the capacity to alter the expectations of an individual
as information.

But in respect of a given choice situa

tion, information refers only to stimuli interpreted as
bearing on the situation in which choice is to be exer
cised, only to those messages relevant to choice.
Moreover, to be regarded as information, an object or
statement is required to be more specific than a common
place.

To an investor who contemplates a commitment in

IBM, the commonplace statement,

"IBM produces computing

machines," is not information.
Nov:, only if an actor is in doubt will he seek
information.

An actor who is already convinced, whose

mind is made up, who does not wish to be "confused" by
additional "facts," no longer entertains alternatives from
which to choose.

But an actor who envisions a set of

alternative actions, the consequences of some or all of
which he is unsure, experiences doubt.

He lacks knowledge

of at least some, and perhaps many, of the factors which
will determine the outcomes of contemplated actions.

The

function of information is to increase the knowledge or to
reduce the doubt of an actor concerning the alternatives
available to him and the possible consequences of each.
But just as not all of the stimuli to which an investor
is continually subject represent information to him,
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not all of those stimuli which represent information are
equally informative.

We define the information content

of a message as its capacity to select responses in a
recipient; that is to say, its capacity to modif; a
recipient’s predisposition to act in some way.
But, to speak of the capacity of information to
modify ah actor's predisposition to act Implies that he
already has some predisposition.

At any moment an

Investor has some current knowledge and state of mind.
He knows in a general way his current investment ends and
preferences; for Income and capital gains and for the
assumption of risk, for example.

He knows, on the basis

of his current (and limited) knowledge and experience, his
personal opinions and subjective expectations concerning
the relative capacities of alternative securities and
firms to serve those ends and preferences.

Moreover, an

investor knows the investment assets which currently
comprise his cashable wealth, and he can, by reference to
contemporary markets in those assets, ascertain the
command over general purchasing power that they represent.
But all of this knowing is tentative, the momentary
resultant of his limited and changing knowledge and
past experience.

As useful as it may be to him, it is

largely his property alone.

He may relate it to others

or he may not, but he may not expect the behavior of others
to be influenced by it.

He may, however, on the basis of

his current state of mind, be regarded as having some

inclination to act, to select a portfolio of security
investments.

The capacity of information to modify an

actor's predisposition to act refers to a modification of
his predisposition based on current knowledge by virtue
of the increased knowledge or reduced doubt information
may Induce in a recipient.

It is the function of

investment (security) analysis to provide information
relevant to the investment choices of persons, to
facilitate their optimal investment choice and adaptation.

7.

Glasses of Investment Information

In respect of information bearing on investment
choices, some ordering of messages is convenient to a
consideration of their interpretation and utilization by
investing persons.

We therefore distinguish two broad

classes of information: that which is independently
ascertainable by investors and that which is supplied by
pQ

corporations themselves.
First, consider that class of information independ
ently ascertainable by investors.

Such information is of

the character of public knowledge which is, or which may
be (perhaps at a price), the property of all men.

At

a general level, for example, all investors have or can
have knowledge of the growth or decline of particular
trades or industries.

As these trends affect the interests

of persons generally and the actions of governmental
^^Chambers, 0£. cit., Chp. 7.

28Ibld., p. 276.

authorities they are matters of diverse public comment.
Persons have or can have knowledge of relative and general
movements in the prices of commodities over time.

They

have or can have knowledge of political, social, and
economic events thought to influence the fortunes of
particular trades and Industries; these, too, are public
k n o w l e d g e .

But investors do not invest in economies,

trades, or Industries.

To choose among the securities of

specific firms in selected trades or industries, they
will want to know something of the probabilities with
which an investment in a given firm may be expected to
produce money in alternative amounts at various times.
Still of the nature of public knowledge but at a more
specific level, investors have or can have knowledge of
the dividends and interest paid by, and of the market
30
prices of, the securities of specific firms.
An individual investor may consider public knowledge,
together with his knowledge and experience generally, as
sufficient to the development of reasoned expectations
of the investment potentials of alternative securities;
for example, he may consider past and present dividends
and securities prices and rates of change in dividends and
29"...the entrepreneur has available a great deal of
evidence about broader market influences. General cyclical
movements and tendencies in politics, in particular, are
likely to be very important to him. That he studies such
phenomena is abundantly plain from the content of news
papers and magazines addressed to businessmen." Hart,
op. cit., p. 79.
3°Chambers, o£. cit., p. 2??.
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prices sufficient indications of future dividends and
prices.-*1

In the vernacular such persons are styled

"market technicians."

Other individuals, styled "funda

mentalists," may consider public information as necessary
though Insufficient to Informed expectations and choices.
Such persons will want to know something of the relative
capacities of specific firms to operate profitably and”
efficiently.

For this purpose they will employ financial

tests of the past performances and present positions of
alternative firms as indications of future potentials.
Now, many factors contribute to the relative superiority
31There is, however, no "price illusion." Securi
ties are legal claims to future money payments, generally
of dividends, interest, and principal sums. That inves
tors may, in their appraisements, anticipate security
prices directly (e. g., on the basis of current or past
prices, configurations of prices, or rates of change in
prices) is a matter of evaluated convenience and suffi
ciency, arising from the revocabllity of security invest
ments. But price expectations are simply expectations of
expectations of future money payments to securities. If
no such money payments are expected (to be expected),
there is no question of what price will be; there will
be no price.
"Like many other propositions in economics,
the irrelevance of dividend policy, given investment
policy, is ’obvious, once you think about it.* It is,
after all, merely one more instance of the general
principle that there are no ’financial illusions' in a
rational and perfect economic environment. Values there
are determined solely by 'real' considerations— in this
case the earning power of the firm's assets and its
investment policy— and not by how the fruits of the
earning power are 'packaged* for distribution."
Merton H. Miller and Franco Modigliani, "Dividend Policy,
Growth, and the Valuation of Shares," Journal of Business.
XXXIV, No. k (October, 1961), ^1^; "...speculators as a
class can profit only by trading with Investors, to
whom they can sell only for income; therefore in the end
all prices depend on someone's estimate of future income."
John Burr Williams,0 The Theory of Investment Value
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard! University Press, 1938), p. 3.

of such measures as between specific firms.

One firm

may have a superior management, a superior location, or
like advantages which contribute to its relative superi
ority; another, superior sources of supply, a superior
labor force, or other advantages.

These differing

superiorities may be expected to differentiate firms as
to their potentials.

However, none of these factors is

capable of objective measurement; only their consequences
are measured by financial tests: the capital structures
of different firms, their financial positions and
standings, and the periodical financial results of their
operations through time.

Fundamentalists, therefore, may

be supposed to engage in retrospective calculations which
utilize the reported financial data of specific corpora
tions in the development of rates and ratios which
purport to measure for specific firms, among other
things: ^
(a) Growth of earnings and sales in the past;
(b) Past profitability;
Stability of past earnings;
(d) Dividend rate and record; and
Financial strength, or credit standing;
as indications of the relative prospects of specific
firms.
It is significant that the measurements which
32Adapted from Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and
Sidney Cottle, Security Analysis (4th ed.; New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962), p. 231.

provide the bases of such indications can only be
obtained from the vouchsafed financial statements of
firms.

Information of these specific kinds is of the

class supplied by corporations themselves in the satis
faction of a quid pro quo arising from the privilege of
corporations to invite the financial support of the
public.

This particular dependence of investing persons

upon information of the class supplied by firms themselves
deserves additional consideration.

Mow, an investor in

the securities of corporate firms, unlike the buyer of a
physical_cpmmodity or warranted service, cannot examine
physically the firm in which he invests.

The only con

venient representation of the firm as a whole is its
set of articulated financial statements.

To the extent

that the expectations of individual investors derive from
the information contained in the published financial
statements of firms, the investor appraisements and valu
ations which arise therefrom depend upon the accounting
processes and processors of firms for information con' 33
temporaneously pertinent. ^

If the financial information

supplied by firms is not of this quality, it may neverthe3k
less be treated as though it were by Investing persons.
33"...evaluation and action are everyman's business.
To provide the corroborable and corroborated financial
statements which will serve as the foundations of everyman's evaluations and actions is the business of...
accounting." Chambers, o£. cit., p. 376.
3k
J "...the reader of a balance sheet as at a speci
fied date will be disposed to interpret all singular
statements in it as designating money measures as at that

2k
And if the belief that such information is presently
pertinent is misplaced, expectations which derive from it
will provide an undependable foundation for security valu
ations; the investment choices of persons and the market
prices of securities will be based on fictions.
8.

Interpretation

Now, expectations derive from one’s perceptions and
interpretations, and information may be variously inter
preted.

similar messages, therefore, may evoke differing

responses in different individuals, different expectations
date, notwithstanding that, to non-monetary items, there
are appended qualifying words such as 'cost* or 'valua
tion' (implicitly at some other date).... In general, the
reader will not suppose that the transmitter would state a
specific date at the outset and then in the body of the
statement include statements relevant as at other dates....
He will suppose that the message is intended to be of use
to him at or about that time, for he can imagine no reason
why the designer and transmitter should have other
intentions or follow rules with other effects." Ibid.,
p. 175? "...the...lay reader of a balance sheet...assumes
that here are the present values of the assets owned by
the concern and here is stated the present net worth.”
H. C. Daines, ”The Changing Objectives of Accounting,”
The Accounting Review, IV, No. 2 (June, 1929), 97.
35it will be c-lear that any distortion has this
effect and clearly discriminates in favor of one or the
other class of a firm's securityholders. So-called "con
servatism,” for example, favors bondholders over share
holders. See Chambers, 0£. cit., pp. 281-283? "It is of
course always possible that people will draw wrong conclu
sions from facts correctly stated, but this is no reason
for withholding information from them. The justification
offered for hiding profits is often that shareholders, if
they knew the true profits, would make Irresponsible
claims and thus jeopardize future earnings. This may be
so, but the other half of the argument rests on an
assumption of managerial infallibility and omniscience
not often borne out by the facts." L. M. Lachmann,
Capital and Its Structure (London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd.,
1956), p. 93.
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for the future.

Evidently important factors affecting

one’s interpretation of a message are one’s knowledge and
experience, the context in which the message is received,
and the reliability accorded the source from which the
message emanates.
In respect of the interpretation of messages bearing
on investment decisions we may distinguish two classes of
messages: (1 ) corroborative or objective statements, or
those which "are capable of test by reference to evidence
which is public, that is, which can be secured by differ
ent observers and does not depend essentially on the
observer, ,,36 and (2 ) subjective statements which subsist
in beliefs or interpretations acknowledged "to be personal,
not necessarily shared by others and beyond

t e s t i n g . "37

In respect of the interpretation of corroborative
information by investors, corroborative economic, social,
and political information is subject to diverse inter
pretation. 38 Corroborative configurations of, and rates
of change in, securities prices are subject to various
interpretations as to the direction and extent of
36carl G « Eempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formation
in Empirical Science," International Encyclopedia of Uni
fied Science II, No. 7 (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1952), 22.
37chambers, 0£. cit., P. 32.
3 % a r and peace news, election news, and news of a
monetary nature, for example, are observed to evoke varying
responses in investing persons.
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expected price movements.

Corroborative ratios and

rates of change computed from the financial statements of
firms may also be accorded varying significances as
indications of future trends.

40

Specifically, the

current positions and past performances of firms may be
variously extrapolated and the public and private plans
4l
of firms may be abandoned or disappointed.
39nence, the highly inexact nature of "technical”
analysis. See Robert D. Edwards and John Magee, Technical
Analysis of Stock Trends (Springfield, Mass.: John Magee,
1964).
hr\
Hence, the highly inexact nature of "fundamental"
analysis. See Graham, Dodd, and Cottle, o£. cit., and
witness, for example, in the financial literature the
continuing debate concerning the relationship of the
(corroborative) capital structures of firms to share
prices; see in particular P. Modigliani and M. H. Miller,
"The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory
of Investment," American Economic Review, XLVIII, No. 3
(June, 1958), 261-297; David DurancL^ "The Cost of Capital
in an Imperfect Market: A Reply to Modigliani and Miller,"
ibid.. XLIX, No. h (September, 1959), 639-655;
Mod'igliani and Miller, "Reply," ibid., 655-669; and
Graham, Dodd, and Cottle, o£. cit:., Chps. 40 and 48.
41

That the future effects of even the corroborative
plans of firms may be variously Interpreted largely miti
gates the advantage of "insiders." A marketing vicepresident, for example, may know that his firm plans
the introduction of a "revolutionarily new" product, but
he will require to interpret this information and his
interpretation may be mistaken. A competitor may be at
the very same moment laying plans for the introduction of
an even more revolutionary product. Estimates relating to
either the product or securities markets are inevitably
speculations about the behavior of individuals or firms
outside of the control and beyond the knowledge of persons
or firms; "No set of estimates can be constructed without
some use of...extrapolation.... In estimating the factors
influencing his customers and suppliers--or, if his esti
mates go deeper, the factors influencing their customers
and suppliers— he is bound to come to variables he can
forecast in no other way." Hart, 0£. cit., p. 77;
"Actually, as I look back upon it, most insiders never
knew enough really to profit from their advance news,and
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The diverse interpretations that are possible of
objective statements notwithstanding, the interpretation
of subjective or speculative statements, such as the
advice of "experts" and market tips and rumors, deserves
particular attention.

Note, however, that we reserve

usage of the term "information" for corroborative state
ments and events.

Therefore, if B tells A, "I expect the

earnings of Corporation X to be $100,000 in the forth
coming quarter," the information to A is that B has
estimated that the earnings of X will be $100,000.
A will interpret this statement in the light of his regard
for the capability of B (his broker, say) as an estimator.
This regard may be of a general nature or as B's capabil
ity is established in A*s experience.

In any event, the

informative effect of such a statement upon A*s expecta
tions will be as B*s estimation or opinion has effect.
Considerable difficulties may therefore arise when, as
outsiders, when they occasionally uncovered something
accurate and important, rarely sensed what to do about it
marketwlse." G. M. Loeb, The Battle for Investment Survival
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957)» p. j?3» "The longer I
operated in Wall Street the more distrustful I became of
tips and •inside* information of every kind. Given time,
I believe that inside information can break the Bank of
England or the United States Treasury." Bernard M. Baruch,
Baruch: My Own Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
Inc., 1937)» p. 111. The conclusion toward which these
observations tend is also implied in a recent dissertation
by Esiu-Kwang Wu, "Corporate Insider Trading, Profitabil
ity, and Stock Price Movement" (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1963); specifi
cally, Dr. Wu concludes from his analysis that corporate
insiders, with whatever special information they may
possess in their stock market trading, have not generally
outperformed the stock market averages.

is usually the case, interpretations must proceed in the
face of contrary opinions.

To the same A, C (A*s barber,

say) may express the opinion, "I expect the earnings of
Corporation X to be $10,000 in the forthcoming quarter."
This statement will have its informative effect also as
C's opinion and in light of A's knowledge and experience
generally which includes knowledge of B'r opinion and
knowledge of A's own regard for the opinions and estima
tions of both B and C.

The interpretation of such

messages as tips and rumors will involve even higher
degrees of abstraction as the referents of statements,
from which an investor may guage reliability, become
increasingly vague.
9.

Costs of Information and the
'Marginal Concept'

The accumulation and interpretation by an investor
of information generally relevant (that is, Information of
a general character which does not contemplate any specific
v

course of action)

is a matter of broad general observa

tion and experience, the resultant of higher order
decisions involving the allocation of one's time between
learning and leisure.

But the accumulation of information

specific to any single course of action represents sacri
fices, generally in time and effort involving definite
^2"Relevance is a general property; its reference
is any and all of the actions available to an actor at a
given time." Chambers, 0£. cit., p. 1^9.
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opportunity costs to the investor and often specifically
in payments such as fees and subscriptions.

As costs

deliberately incurred are incurred in the expectation
of gain, it may be supposed that an investor will struc
ture his development of information about alternative
specific investments in such a way "that the marginal
utility of the information content of the summarized
information shall exceed the marginal cost of deriving
it.
Though an investor may employ the extent of his
*44
knowledge and experience generally
and though he may
compute the margins with care, (volitional, cognitive,
and physical) constraints will limit the alternatives
^3ibld., p. 32; "Here, as in other economic affairs,
there is a margin beyond which a gain which would be very
attractive, 'other things equal,' is not worth pursuing,
because to do so involves sacrificing more Important
alternative gains. Unfortunately it must remain eternally
a matter of guesswork just where the margin of profitable
estimation and planning lies. For it is impossible to
tell accurately whether assembling more data and planning
more carefully will yield enough improvement in income
to pay for itself.” Hart, oj). cit., p. 81.
^ 11The investor with a technical or scientific
background, for example, can bring his knowledge and
aptitude into play by Including electronics, chemical,
and other technically oriented companies among those to
be reviewed and analyzed for his investment program.
Similarly, any other type of specialized knowledge or
experience may be applied by the investor, through
concentration upon specific companies— subject, of course,
to the risk overspecialization involves. The investor
with a statistical bent can maintain tables, charts, and
graphs which will be helpful and rewarding to him. Many
other non-flnancial aims can be similarly linked with
investment activities." Richard N. Stillman, The
Strategy of Investment (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1962), p. 21.

which he can know (to-, we may suppose, a finite, even
small, number) and the effectiveness with which the
consequences of any known alternative can be appraised.
And, in any case, no amount of information an investor
can develop, analyze, and interpret can provide him
with an expectation for the future which is certain.
As a part of the process of choice, he will require to
conceive on only variously (un)informed bases of a
security's future returns M-j_, M2 , . ..* Mn, separated by
successive time intervals t^, t£, ..., tn , but he cannot
know such future monetary amounts with certainty.

At

best and after even the most probing analysis and lengthy
deliberation, he will conceive of a series of expected
returns.

An uncertain future will require therefore

that he conceive of the consequences of a commitment in
some security as a series of only more or less certain
returns: Mj_ more or less, M2 more or less, ..., Mn more
or less.
In a mathematical sense (though the investor need
not be explicitly aware of it), for a given security
investment he will conceive not of a series of dividends
(or interest or rental payments), but of a series of
distributions, however narrow, of "probable” dividends
over the anticipated investment period and a distribution
of "probable" share prices (or bond prices or proceeds
from the maturities of bonds or whatever) at the end of
the period.

He will do so because the future is uncertain,
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and he can know nothing with certainty concerning it.

CHAPTER II
THE PROBABILISTIC APPRAISEMENT
OP SECURITY INVESTMENTS
1.

Introduction

Hitherto, we have conceived generally of probabili
ties as only more or less intensely felt beliefs concerning
the range of possible outcomes of some alternative action.
As a matter of theoretical accuracy, this is the essence
of case probability.!

But as a practical matter, analysis

typically requires concreteness beyond a mere ordinal
ranking.2

This concreteness may be accomplished through a

l"Case probability is not open to any kind of numeri
cal evaluation." Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (3d rev.
ed.; Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, T9"66), p. 113; At an
early date, von Kreis spoke of the relation between uncer
tain events as being only that of "more or less probable,"
not capable of further specification. J. von Kreis, Die
Prlnzipien der Wahrsoheinllchkeitsrechnung (Freiburg,
1886), pp. 26 ff., quoted in Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen,
"The Nature of Expectation and Uncertainty," Expectations,
Uncertainty, and Business Behavior (ed. Mary Jean Bowman;
New York: Social Science Research Council, 1958)» P. H *
2Professor Jacob Marschak suggests that his analysis
could proceed equally well if probabilities were considered
as ranks instead of cardinal numbers, but he does not elab
orate the suggestion; see Jacob Marschak, "Lack of Confi
dence," Social Research 8 , No. 1 (February, 19*H), ^1-62;
"The assumption of ordinal probabilities, however, seems
to the present writer to lead into a blind alley. If
probability estimates are merely ordinal, their expectation
value, dispersion, skewness, etc., lack measurability; and
for lack of units we are unable to set up preference scales
32
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metaphorical expression of subjective degrees of belief
in numerical

terms.3

Persons may thus be thought to

attach to prospective events weights which obey the cal
culus of probability, regardless of how these weights are
derived or of how they subsist in the minds of reasonable
persons.^
Notice that these appraised probabilities are
among them." Albert Gailord Hart, "Risk, Uncertainty, and
the Unprofitability of Compounding Probabilities," Studies
in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 19^2), p. 111.
3This view, it should be noted, corresponds to that
of the Subjectivist School and has been ably developed and
presented by Frank Plumpton Ramsey, The Foundations of
Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Company, 1931) and Leonard J. Savage, The
Foundations of Statistics (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 195*0? "According to these views, the same logical
criteria should be applied to the, degrees of belief
relating to, say, stock prices or the outcome of elec
tions, etc., as to experiments with practically fair
coins. No one denies, of course, that an element of
objectivity enters into the degrees of belief concerning
the conventional coin experiments to a much greater
extent than into degrees of belief concerning the stock
exchange, since most intelligent people arrive at (prac
tically) the identical degrees of belief about (prac
tically) fair coins, while the degrees of belief relating
to the stock exchange, to business investments of all
sorts, to political elections, ect., are subjective not
only in principle, but are subjective in the essential
sense of reflecting very wide interpersonal differences
of appraisal even among the well informed."
William Fellner, Probability and Profit (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1965), pp. 31-32.
^"...we estimate probabilities every minute of every
day, at least implicitly, and...how we do this is unknown."
Irving J. Good, The Estimation of Probabilities (Cambridge,
Mass.: The M. I. T. Press, 196577 P* ly 5 "Nevertheless, for
the purposes of making decisions, we do manage to make
approximate estimates of probabilities. How this is done
is an interesting problem in psychology and neuro
psychology." Ibid., p. 4.

3^

personal and need not have Justification in the eyes of
anyone else.

It is required only that the stable and

personal degrees of belief of an individual concerning
the future possible outcomes of a contemplated action
display an internal consistency, or coherence, which
reduces to the addition of the probabilities of mutually
exclusive events and the multiplication of the probabili
ties of Independent events.

For illustration, suppose an

individual is convinced that at the end of pome (short)
investment period the net price of a share,^ denoted by
the random variable V, will assume discrete monetary
values, Vj_, v g

vn , termed events on the set S.

Then he will appraise the probabilities (denoted P) with
which he expects the share to sell at any price vA
according to the following requirements:
(a) P(v^) = some real number

0;

(b) If (vA n vj) = 0 , P(vi U vj) = P(vA ) + P(vj);
and (c) P(S) = lj
where 0 represents the null set.
Now, it will be apparent that only if the number of
envisioned possible future prices is large may we approx
imate the expectation of an individual concerning
5Net, that is, of expected taxes and expected trans
action costs. The favorable taxation of capital gains is
therefore considered, mutatls mutandl. However, as tax
rates are observed to vary, generally with income levels,
and from time to time as a result of legislative actions,
and as costs of transactions are also observed to change,
persons will require to anticipate variations in these
rates through time.
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a particular security as a continuous probability dis
tribution.

It will be apparent also that persons are

much more likely to conceive of a finite, even small,
number of "representative" future prices.

Nonetheless,

a continuous distribution is consistent with the vagaries
of the future and is analytically convenient.
Accordingly, we shall suppose an investor assesses the
probabilities with which a given security will sell at
various prices at some future date as a continuous dis
tribution.

As an illustration, consider the investor who

entertains an expectation concerning a given share invest
ment over some planning period.

Now, either take the

interval short enough or assume the periodic re-investment
of dividends so as to restrict the expected outcome of the
investment to the price at which the share is expected to
sell at the end of the investment period.

The vagaries of

the future will require that the investor assess his
expectations in probabilistic terms.

He will therefore

conceive of a distribution of "probable" future selling
"A continuous distribution...is far more convenient
than a discrete distribution, and even if it must be lit
erally false, it leads to conclusions regarding intervals
of weights which would match the conclusions of an accept
able discrete distribution so closely that there is no
point in worrying about the difference, the difference is
on the side of rational caution; anyway." Henry E. Kyburg,
Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief (Middletown,
Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961 ), PP. 230- 231 ; "The
application of continuity to cases where it does not
really exist illustrates the great utility which fictions
sometimes have in science." Charles S. Peirce, quoted
in John G. Peatman, Introduction to Applied Statistics
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963)* p. 41.

prices (or "probable" future monetary values) of the
share.

The investor may be supposed to conceive also of

the current or appraised price (or prices) at which he
may expect to purchase the security in question and, by
inference, of a (continuous) probability distribution of
possible future monetary gains and losses in cashable
wealth as a result of the contemplated share investment.
Figure 2-1 depicts such a probability distribution of
gains and losses (x), defined by the probability density
function f(x) over the range R of ex ante probable
monetary gains and losses on the security over the
investment horizon.?

For notational consistency (and

realism), we may suppose further that the investor con
ceives of probabilities over small "ranges" of ex ante
. “t

gains and losses on the security and express the proba
bility of a future outcome in any range (of gains and
losses), say a to b, as
P(a<x<b) =

2.

f f(x)dx.
aJ

Parametric Specification of
Probability Distributions

The geometrical conception of Figure 2-1 is not the
only way in which the probabilistic expectations of persons
may be described.

In a discussion of the choices of per-

?We place no restrictions on the shape of the
distribution except coherence with the calculus of proba
bility; see above, p. 3^.

f (X)

-X

0
EX ANTE

LOSSES

X
EX

ANTE

GAINS

Figure 2-1. A Subjective Probability Distribution Over Ex Ante
Gains and Losses Appraised Possible on a (Specified) Security
Over Some (Specified) Investment Horizon.

sons among alternative securities, it is clearly not the
best way.

For this purpose it is particularly convenient

to compute summary measures of the significant character
istics of distributions.

One Important parameter of a

probability distribution, for example, is its mean or
expected value or mathematical expectation, defined as
E = Jjj xf(x)dx.
We shall refer to E as the expected monetary gain (loss)
of an investor’s probability distribution of ex ante gains
and losses on a security.

It should be clear, however,

that this term is only imperfectly related to the verb
"to expect.”

The mathematically expected value of a dis

tribution is no more or no less than an average; it is the
weighted average of possible gain and loss outcomes with
probabilities of occurrence (of those gains and losses) as
O
weights.
The "expected” monetary gain (loss) on a
security over the investment period is therefore simply a
measure of the "center of gravity" or "central tendency"
of the distribution of ex ante gains and losses to which
it refers.
Having specified the mean or mathematical expectation
of a distribution, it is convenient to compute those
moments about the mean gain (loss) of the distribution
®Earry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection; Efficient
Diversification of Investments, Cowles Foundation Mono
graph No. 16 (New York; John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959)»
p. ^8.
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which have practical significance and may therefore be
supposed to bear upon investor choices.

For example, the

second moment^ about the mathematical expectation of a
distribution and the square root of the second moment
measure the dispersion of possible (gain and loss) out
comes around the expectation (gain or loss).

Alternatively

stated, they measure the absolute uncertainty of the
mathematically expected gain (loss) of the distribution.
The second moment, called also the variance, is defined
by
E2 =

(x-E)2f(x)dx.

The square root of E2 , termed the standard deviation and
generally denoted by a, also provides a general description
of the uncertainty surrounding the mathematical expectation
of gain (loss).
Note here that "uncertainty" as we have used the
term and as its statistical measures are computed implies
nothing necessarily detrimental about a distribution.
Uncertainty as a general characteristic implies variation:
the existence of more than one possible outcome of some
action.

In the same way that the mathematically expected

monetary gain (loss) on a security is an average of all
^The first moment about the mean of a distribution
defines the mathematical expectation as a measure of loca
tion and is by definition equal to zero. Knowledge of the
first moment about the mean is.therefore implicit in
Tmowledge of the mean itself.

*K>
the different possible monetary gain and loss outcomes of
an investment (each one weighted by its associated proba
bility), the dispersion of the distribution as a measure
of the uncertainty surrounding the investment is a
characteristic of the distribution of gain and loss out
comes as a whole: of that part (if any) which represents
possible gains, as well as of that part (if any) which
represents possible losses.'*'®
The third moment about the mean of a probability
distribution of monetary gains and losses thought
probable on a security,
e3 “ Jr

(x-E)-^f (x)dx,

1o
Again, note particularly the nature of the second
moment about the mathematical expectation of a distribu
tion as a measure of uncertainty as generally descriptive
of the average variation within the distribution of
envisioned possible future outcomes. This concept of
uncertainty is to be distinguished from the narrower
concept of "market risk" as the possibility of loss
alone.
In the development of a measurement of risk per se
(in the narrower sense), we may (following Evsey D. Domar
and Richard A. Musgrave, "Proportional Income Taxation and
Risk-Taking," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LVIII (May,
1 9 ^ ) , 393-39871 split the distribution of expected
monetary gains and losses on the security into its pos
itive and negative parts and take the average or expected
value of each part separately. The mathematical expecta
tion of the positive (or gain) component of the distribu
tion, expressed as a ratio to the appraised purchase price,
represents the expected positive yield y on the security.
The mathematical expectation of the negative (or loss)
component, expressed as a ratio to the appraised purchase
price, represents the expected negative yield r on the
security. Now, in its conventional usage risk denotes the
probability of loss, of an actual yield less than zero.
Since the individual investor is not only interested in the
probability of a negative yield, but also in the chances of
suffering losses of varying magnitudes, a relevant measure
of the risk involved in a security is given by r, the summa
tion of all possible losses weighted by their probabilities.

^

in

measures its absolute skewness and refers to the area
under the more pronounced tail of an asymmetric distribu
tion.

As the excess tail of the distribution includes

outcomes greater or lesser than the mean outcome, the
distribution is described as positively or negatively
skewed, respectively.

Evidentially, positive skewness,

the possibility of large gains, is a desirable charac
teristic of a security's appraised probability distribu
tion of monetary gains and losses, while negative skew
ness, the appraised possibility of large losses on a
security, is undesirable.

11

The fourth moment about the mean of a probability
distribution,
Ety, = Jjj (x-E)^f(x)dx,
measures the absolute kurtosls, or "peakedness," of the
distribution of ex ante gains and losses and indicates
the degree to which the envisioned possible gains and
losses on a security are concentrated around the modal, or
most probable, gain (loss) outcome (a peaked curve) or
decentralized from the modal outcome to both tails (a
flat curve).

Generally, the nth moment about the mean of

a distribution is given by
-’-•'■This conclusion is also implied in the utility of
wealth function specified by Harry Markowitz, "The Utility
of Wealth," Journal of Political Economy, LX, No. 2
(April, 1952), lf>6 ; see also G. L. S. Snackle,
Expectation in Economics (London: The Cambridge University
Press, 1952), pp. 119-121.
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En = Jr

(*>E)nf (x)dx,

and the fifth and higher moments measure more esoteric
characteristics.

If the probability distribution is

continuous, so that an infinite number of outcomes is
possible, it is a very difficult theorem, but true, that
knowledge of all the moments is equivalent to knowledge
12
of the distribution itself.
An uncertain situation can
therefore be described fully by the moments of the proba13
bility distribution of its ex ante outcomes. J We may
suppose, however, that the number of moments of practical
significance to the investor is finite and we denote the
probability distribution of an investor for a security as
an n-parameter density function over possible future gains
and losses, and since the mathematical expectation, the
second, third, and fourth moments clearly have important
descriptive significance, we include these explicitly:
f (x j E , Eg,

, Ejj,, •• . ,

)•

the uncertain situation has k possible outcomes,
then it is a matter of elementary algebra that if any (k-1 )
moments are known, the probabilities of the k outcomes can
be computed.
■'•^A probability distribution may be fully described
in other ways as well. For some purposes, for example,
the moment generating function or the characteristic
function (the Laplace and Fourier transforms of the proba
bility distribution, respectively) are more useful than
either the distribution itself or its moments. See
Robert Dorfman, "Basic Economic and Technologic Concepts:
A General Statement," in Arthur Maass, et. al., Design
of Water-Resouroe Systems (Cambridge, Hass.: Harvard
University Press, 1966), p. 138.

^3
3.

The Probabilistic Appraisement of
Alternative Investments

Removing the assumption that dividends (or interest
or rental payments) over the investment horizon are
expected to be nil or that they are re-invested, the
investor may anticipate such payments, also probabilis
tically.

Ignoring momentarily any discrepancies in the

timing of monetary flows incidental to a given security,
the mathematically expected monetary gain (loss) on the
security in question is now obtained from the distribu
tions of probable dividends and probable future market
prices (all net).

The mathematically expected monetary

gain (loss) on the security is given by the sum of the
mathematical expectations of the distributlon(s) of future
dividends and the mathematical expectation of the distribu
tlon of future market prices net of a current or appraised
purchase price.

The variance of this mathematically

expected gain (loss) is given by the sum of the variances
of the probability distributions of future dividends and
the variance of the distribution of future market prices
net of current price, on the assumption that these are
Independent distributions.

For simplicity, and without

evident loss of generality, we assume hereafter the pay
ment of all dividends, interest, or rent at the end of
the investment planning period.
Now, though we have spoken above of the appraisal
of a given security, it will be apparent that, as the

securities of a given class of a specific firm are
perfectly homologous, the expectation of an investor in
respect of any given common share (say) in Corporation X
will be Identical.

Once the investor has appraised the

prospects of a share of X common, that is, once he has
specified to his satisfaction the probability distribution
of future monetary gains and losses for one such share,
he may be supposed to contemplate alternatively-sized
commitments in X common.

For any commitment I in

security S, therefore, an investor will envision a proba
bility distribution of future monetary gains and losses
on the Investment.

Such a probability distribution can

be obtained directly from the probability distribution
of ex ante gains and losses on a single security in which
such a commitment is considered.

For an investment I

in some number i of securities S, for example, where
f s (x; E, E2 , E^, Ety, ..., E ^

specifies the appraised

distribution of future monetary gains and losses on a
single security S, the probability distribution of
ex ante gains and losses on I is given by
fs (x; IE, i2E2 , i^E^, i^Ejj,..... ^En)*

Significantly,

the variance of the distribution of gains and losses
on the investment increases by the square of i and the
absolute skewness of the distribution increases by the
oube of i as i increases.

These observations will have

specific relevance at a later time.

Again, it is the function, generally, of an
investing person’s knowledge and experience and, in par
ticular, of his investment analyses, to form reasoned
expectations of the distributions of monetary outcomes
to which we have referred; to appraise the probabilities
with which alternative security investments may be expected
to alter one’s wealth over an uncertain future; to Increase
the likelihood of his optimal investment adaptation.

This

he will do to the extent he deems appropriate to choice.
He may not construct a probability distribution of the
possible gain and loss outcomes resulting from alternative
investments; he may not assess numerical probabilities to
each such outcome or compute an average value or the
variance and higher moments; but he will conceive of
alternative outcomes for those investments he seriously
considers; he will conceive of the di-spersion of such
outcomes and the "chances" with which they may be
expected to occur, if these are only more or less
intensely felt.

He will, because he is neither omnicient

nor omnipotent, yet he must make decisions which contem
plate the future.

He will do-so because he must choose

in the face of uncertainty.
4.

A Note on the Treatment of Uncertainty

The general scheme adopted here in the treatment of
uncertain expectations, that each investor treats his
expectations in terms of subjective probability distribu
tions over possible outcomes for each alternative
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Investment commitment he entertains, corresponds to the
14
"orthodox" view, well established in economic theory.
There is, however, no orthodoxy concerning the statistical
measures to be used to describe one's expectations.
Whereas we have held that at least the first four moments
and at most a finite number of moments are required for
choice among distributions, writers have generally
characterized the complete distributions by no more than
their first and second moments (e. g . , E and E2 or o),1^ a
i^See, for example, Domar and Musgrave, 0£. cit.,
pp. 381-422; William Fellner, Monetary Policies and Full
Employment (2d ed.; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1947)» PP. 152-158; J. H. Hicks,
Value and Capital (2d ed.; London: Oxford University
Press, i£46J, p. 125; 0. Lange, Price Flexibility and
Full Employment (Bloomington, Indiana: The Principle
Press, 1944), p. 30; Friederich and Vera Lutz, The Theory
of Investment of the Firm (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, l95i)> Chp. XV; Helen Makower and Jacob Marschak,
"Assets, Prices, and Monetary Theory," Economica, V,
No. 19 (August, 1938), 261-288; Gunnar Myrdal, Monetary
Equilibrium (London: W. Hodge & Co., Ltd., 1939)» PP. 5859; A. d. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th ed.;
London: Macmillan and Co., 193277 Appendix 1.
•^professor Jacob Marschak adds to the mean and
standard deviation a supplementary measure of the "relia
bility" of alternative distributions. He says: "It must
be recognized that an individual may estimate two assets
as having the same expected value, yet be aware that the
two estimates have different degrees of reliability
according to the different types of information at his
disposal. This...calls for the use of additional concepts
(reliability) analogous to those developed by the modern
theory of statistical inference." Jacob Marschak, "Lack
of Confidence," Social Research, VIII, No. 1 (February,
1941), 53. This position represents a general dissatis
faction with the use of numerical assessments of case
(subjective) probabilities and suggests that these proba
bilities must be "discounted" in some generally unspeci
fied way.
(See, for example, J. von Neumann and 0.
Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (3d ed.;
Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1^53)» P. i9 ff.;
R. D. Luce and H. Ralffa, Games and Decisions (New York:
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position we reject as clearly unsatisfactory.
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Shackle*s Objection Considered
At a general level, it should be noted that the
orthodox treatment of uncertainty has never seemed com
pletely adequate to many students of the problem and has,
upon occasion, been severely attacked.

G. L. S. Shackle

17

has been particularly critical of the use of probability
notions as applied to the behavior of uncertain investors
John Wiley & Sons, Ino., 1957)» Appendix 1; and especially
J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London: The
Macmillan Company, 1921), p. 3^3 ^f. ) But "how far should
such an argument be pushed? Should an additional discount
be added, for example, to_ cover the unreliability of the
reliability estimate*s reliability?" Donald E. Farrar,
The Investment Decision Under Uncertainty (Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., £962}, p. 6. Professor A. G.
Hart, in an article fetchingly entitled "Risk, Uncertainty,
and the Unprofitability of Compounding Probabilities,"
op. cit., argues effectively against such a procedure.
And in deference to Occam* s Razor we forgo any attempt
to further complicate the present analysis.
^ S e e above, pp. 39-42; "We are not affected merely
by what we regard as the most probable of a set of possible
outcomes, or even by an average ’expected value* weighted
by various probabilities; we are affected in our behavior
by the less probable or even by the most improbable, of
possible outcomes, as witnessed by the demand for sweep
stakes tickets, wildcat shares, and, in some cases, matri
mony." Kenneth E. Boulding, A Reconstruction of Economics
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1950), p. TT7; "It is
a simplification to assume that the Investor chooses
among the alternative probability distributions...avail
able to him on the basis of only two parameters of those
distributions. Even if the simplification is accepted,
the mean and standard deviation may not be the pair of
parameters that concern the investor." J. Tobin,
"Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk," The
Review of Economic Studies, XXV, No. 67 (February, 1958),
W.
17shackle, o£. cit.

%
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and apparently has been unable to conceive of probability
as having other than a class meaning.

Shackle’s objec

tions to orthodoxy at a general level have themselves
18
been critically considered by Chase.
In the construc
tion of an alternative theory, Shackle contends that to
each possible (investment) course of action the Investor
attaches a "focus-gain" and a "focus-loss."

The investor

then selects that course of action whose combination of
focus-gain and focus-loss he prefers to all other avail
able combinations of the two.

But, in this regard

Shackle's theory lacks convincing appeal.

By ending with

two values relevant for choice (the focus-gain and the
focus-loss), Shackle has simply eliminated a large number
of other possibilities.

And saying that "investors con

centrate on two from among all the possible outcomes
seems no more inherently correct than saying that they
concentrate on three or ten— or even on one, the ultimate
19

reduction." 7

Or: It seems perfectly permissible to be

uneasy, along with Shackle (and Chase), about the use of
•^Samuel B. Chase, Jr., Asset Prices in Economic
Analysis (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1963), p.
^■^Ibld., pp. 62 and 7^. This argument applies with
(at least) equal force to Professor Angell's "'most
likely' gain outcome" and "'most likely' loss outcome."
Cf. especially: "He does not, in his own mind, in effect
balance or trade a small increase in prospective gain,
for example, against a small decrease in likelihood.
Once his estimates of the 'most likely' gain and loss
outcomes are made, all other possible outcomes cease to
interest him." James W. Angell, "Uncertainty, Likeli
hoods and Investment Decisions," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, LXXIV, No. 1 (February, I96C), 6 .

^9
"probability distribution reasoning," and still to prefer
it to Shackle's theory, for many features of investor
behavior cannot be rationalized in any other manner yet
developed, including

Shackle's.^

Knight1s Objection Considered
Also in opposition to orthodoxy, Prank H. Knight2!
has preferred to differentiate situations of (objective)
"risk" from those of (subjective) uncertainty.

In

Knightian reasoning, to qualify as a risk situation an
experiment must be repetitive in nature and must possess
an objective frequency distribution from which observa
tions can be made and from which Inferences can be drawn
by statistical procedures.

Problems involving conjecture

and to which the concept of class (frequency) probability
is not applicable are held to involve uncertainty, not
risk.

Knight then concludes that entrepreneurial decisions

and profits (and presumably individual investment decisions)
belong in the theory of uncertainty, not in that of.risk.
20"The notion that human beings simply cannot set up
meaningful 'subjective probabilities' and apply them to the
likelihood that events "may diverge from a central estimate
strikes me as unacceptable.
...it would leave us with
such very untractable models that analysis would be para
lyzed.... Whatever happened, we would be reduced to saying
we supposed the outcome was what people in some sense pre
ferred.
...the notion that people cannot visualize proba
bilities of contingencies does not strike me as plausible.
An everyday piece of evidence is the place in our folk
ways of the 'fair bet.'" Albert Hart, quoted in
Mary Jean Bowman, "Introduction," Expectations, Uncer
tainty , and Business Behavior, op. cit., p. 67
2:!-Prank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19^0).

50
The difficulty with Knightian reasoning is that it does
not develop a theory of uncertainty.

It simply suggests

that if there does exist a useful theory of uncertainty,
it must be different from the theory of probability in the
frequency-objectivist sense, though there may exist border
line problems which it is difficult to classify.
The discussion which Knight presents is apt to
leave the reader with the impression that the process of
decision under uncertainty is left completely open to the
creativity of the Individual decision-maker and that "any
thing goes."

Yet, by subjecting degrees of belief in

general to the uniform rules of numerical probability
merely Implies that the entire set of degrees of belief
which a person holds must obey the internal consistency
requirements of probability theory.

The development of

coherent degrees of belief is left entirely to the crea
tive faculties of the individual decision-maker.

But it

does seem that any useful decision theory must be able to
draw a distinction between consistent behavior, on the one
hand, and erroneous or whimsical behavior, on the other.
It is therefore unsatisfactory to argue that in matters of
decision-making under uncertainty incoherence is permis
sible.

And while Knight may not have intended to suggest

a wholly anarchic attitude toward the area of uncertainty,
he leaves many of his readers with the impression that the
main difference between risk and uncertainty is that an
articulate theory is applicable to the former but not to

51
the latter.22

Again, it seems perfectly permissible to

be uneasy, now along with Knight, about the use of proba
bility distribution reasoning and still to prefer it (now)
to no theory of uncertainty at all.
22pellner, Probability and Profit, pp. 29-31.

CHAPTER III
THE UTILITY OP UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS
1.

Introduction

An investor, we have said, will require to appraise
the probabilities associated with the various envisioned
outcomes or consequences of commitments in alternative
securities over some Investment horizon.

Solely as an

analytical convenience we have assumed an investor will
assign numerical probabilities to each alternative possi
ble outcome in a fashion consistent with the requirements
of mathematical probability theory and that he will
arrive finally at a probability distribution over the
expected gains and losses for each of a finite set of
alternative investments.

Since expectations derive from

the interpretation of information available to the
investor at the time a decision is required, given the
extent of his knowledge and experience generally, judg
ments concerning future gains and losses on securities
and the (case) probabilities assigned to alternative out
comes reflect the intensely personal and perhaps contro
versial beliefs and opinions of the investor at hand.
But the specification of distributions such as
those of which we have spoken for a set of securities,
52

while a necessary part of reasoned choice, does not
itself constitute choice.

His analysis completed, or

cut short, an investor will require to select from among
appraised alternatives, the outcomes of all of which are
uncertain, those, if any, to which he will commit his
wealth.

Though he cannot know beforehand the conse

quences of his investment choices, he will require to
select his portfolio.
Now, when early mathematicians first formulated
principles of human behavior under conditions of chance
and uncertainty (primarily gambling situations), they
assumed that the objective of choice was to maximize
expected monetary gain.

For illustration, consider an

investor who contemplates the allocation of his wealth
among alternative securities i, for each of which he has
in mind the mathematical expectation of gain G-^.

For

the present, assume a uniform Investment period.

As

specific securities are perfectly homologous (the
mathematically expected gain on identical securities is
identical), it follows that an investor would never
prefer a diversified portfolio.

If one security promised

a greater expected monetary gain them any other, the
investor would place all of his funds in that security.
If several securities promised the same (greatest)
expected gain in wealth to the investor, he would be
Indifferent among portfolios, diversified or not, which
contained only those securities, in whatever
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quantities.

But investing persons are observed to

diversify their holdings.

This contradiction is

sufficient to enjoin our tentative rejection of the
view that persons choose among alternative courses of
investment actions to maximize expected monetary gains
to themselves.
2.

A Digression on Certainty Equivalence

More recently, decision theorists have sought to
explain the investment choices of persons in terms of
certainty equivalence models.

They begin by assuming

uncertainty (dispersion) to be ,lbad.M

Consequently, a

reasonable investor can be Induced to increase the
uncertainty which he will bear only if it is accompanied
by a compensatory increase in the expected gain of an
alternative.

Prior to choice, the expected gains of

alternatives require to be discounted by some measure of
the uncertainty involved in each.

Not infrequently,

therefore, the certainty equivalence approach to decision
making is referred to as an "uncertainty discount" approach.2
The procedure of certainty equivalence is quite
straightforward.

Having chosen some measure of the

central tendency of an investment alternative (generally
•^Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection: Efficient .
Diversification of Investments, Cowles foundation Mono
graph No. '16 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959)*
p. 207.
2Donald E. Farrar, The Investment Decision Under
Uncertainty (Englewood Cliff s, N1. J . : Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1962), p. 11.
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the expected monetary gain or rate of return), a measure
of its dispersion (generally the standard deviation) is
also selected.

The theorist then constructs an artifi

cial variate,
v = f (p,,ct) ,

(1 )

where v is the alternative's certainty equivalent, n is
its expected value (of gain, i.e., E, or return, for
example), and a is the standard deviation of the proba
bility distribution of outcomes of the alternative.
The certainty equivalent's function is to collapse
the two parameters, expected value and dispersion, of an
uncertain prospect into a single dimension "from which
uncertainty has been purged and by which, therefore,
unambiguous choices can be made."^

The function,

v0 = f (m-,o),

(2 )

then, can be likened to an indifference curve defined by
the locus of (m-,o) points whose values are evaluated equal
to the certain receipt of

vq

dollars.

For each alterna

tive investment described by the points (m.,o), a unique
certainty equivalent exists,
vj = f(nj,oj),

(3)

by which its desirability can be compared to that of
other opportunities.
^Ibid., p. 12.

The solution, choosing the investment whose
expected value and uncertainty are equivalent to the
investor of the certain receipt of

vq

dollars, is in

most respects identical to the classical equilibrium of
consumer choice.

It envisions the maximization of an

objective function (the certainty equivalent) subject to
the constraints of the investor*s wealth and the avail
able investment opportunities.

Geometrically, it con

sists of the usual tangency between an indifference curve
and the border of a set of obtainable combinations; where
in equilibrium, the investor’s marginal rate of substitu
tion between expected value (of gain, for example) and
dispersion is equal to his marginal rate of transforma
tion between these parameters.^
Notice that the certainty equivalence approach,
though it may speak of risk, discounts uncertainty.^

But

as we have noted above, the uncertainty of an investment
alternative as measured by the dispersion of expected
gains and losses on the investment is not detrimental
per se.

On the contrary, positive skewness in the dis£
trlbution is desirable.
Yet, a certainty equivalence

model of the form given in (3) would '’discount" the
expected gain on a security, say 100 dollars, for the
^Ibid., p. U .
^That is, variation in the possible outcomes of an
alternative action.
(L

°See above, pp. 4-0-41.
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(albeit slight) probability envisioned by the investor of
a gain of 1,000 dollars (say) on the security.

This

contradicts reason and common observation and is clearly
untenable.
Secondly and conclusively, as it is usually
developed, the certainty equivalence approach examines
each alternative as an individual investment, and not as
a portion of a larger set of investment holdings.

Con

sequently, it can never explain the reasonable possession
of more than one security (the best) by an investor at
any moment in time.?

The certainty equivalence m o d e l s

inability to explain the observed existence of diversified
portfolios is undoubtedly one of its most serious weakQ
nesses.
It reduces it to virtual impotence.
3.

Further Digression: The Procedure
of Markowitz Considered

It should be observed that certainty equivalence,
at least as an explanation of investor behavior, has been
rescued from certain oblivion by Harry Markowitz.

In a

widely acclaimed contribution, Markowitz demonstrates
that the same mentality which motivates the certainty
equivalence approach to uncertainty (that is, a preference
for expected value and a distaste for dispersion) can be
shown to lead to the development of a balanced, or
7see above, pp. 53-5^.
®Farrar, 0£. cit., p. 16.

diversified, portfolio of investment securities.^

The

substance of Markowitz* (largely geometric) argument has
been succinctly described by Farrar.

10

Let

represent

a price index for security i, having unit value during
the current time period.

Assume the existence of n such

securities.
M-i * E(Xj.)
denotes the expected price (index) of security i at the
end of the investment horizon or planning period.

For

each pair of alternatives, i and J, the investor antici
pates a covariance,
aij = E(X1-p,i )(Xj —|j,j ),
about their expected values.

Like investor anticipations

generally, this estimate for each pair of alternatives
derives from the knowledge and experience of the individ
ual in question; in particular, his knowledge of, and
experience with, correlations in security returns.

11

^Harry Markowitz, "Portfolio Selection," Journal of
Finance, VII, No. 1 (March, 1952), 77-91.
10Farrar, o£. cit., pp. 16-18.
11

"The correlation among returns is not the same
for all securities. We generally expect the returns on a
security to be more correlated with those in the same
Industry than those of unrelated industries. Business
connections among corporations, the fact that they service
the same area, a common dependence on military expendi
tures, building activity, or the weather can increase the
tendency of particular returns to move up or down together.
Markowitz, Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification
of Investments, p. 5.

is the proportion of the investor’s total portfolio
committed to security 1 :

= 1 , therefore; and

is the portfolio Itself.
The application of expected value operators to the
weighted sum shows that a portfolio's expected value is
nothing but the same weighted sum of each security's
Individual expected value,
E(1 ) “ Dcim-1 ,

i — 1,2,

...,n;

and that its variance can be expressed as the quadratic
form,
V(r) =

i^* i j •

^ 3 = 1, 2, ..., n.

Next, decomposing the portfolio's variance into a linear
sum of the variances and covariances, respectively, of
individual securities,

we note the possibility of a portfolio whose variance is
smaller than the smallest variance possessed by a single
security depends only on the existence of sufficiently
small covariance elements.

There is, of course, no

apparent reason why the covariance elements cannot be
negative and why, therefore, a diversified portfolio
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cannot yield a variance which is smaller, for almost any
given expected value (of gain or return), than that for
a single security.

In fact, it can easily be shown that

"such is usually the case."

1?

The untenable assumption of uncertainty avoidance
notwithstanding,"^ however, the procedure suggested by
Markowitz is unsatisfactory as an explanation of investor
behavior on several important grounds.

First, by pos

turing his analysis in terms which involve a re-orienta
tion of the manner in which an investor is assumed to
evaluate alternative Investment commitments'— terms which
suggest that an investor focuses upon the performance
(return and stability) of an overall portfolio— Markowitz
endears himself to trust managers but departs from the
a priori well-grounded.

That portfolio performance is

but an incidental, though important, consequence of
individually considered, appraised, and evaluated invest
ment commitments, though certainly expected correlations
among the performances of securities may be given consid
eration (primarily in the selection of alternatives to
appraise and evaluate), seems highly appealing to reason.
In the absence of sufficient supporting evidence, a
contrary position must remain a Markowitz hypothesis.
l2Farrar, oja. cit., p. 18; see also Markowitz,
"Portfolio SeleclTion" and Portfolio Selection; Efficient
Diversification of Investments, Part III.
13lndeed, we could easily recast the certainty equiv
alence model to discount risk per se (r) in the sense dis
cussed above; see above, p. kO,

Second and more damaging, in demonstrating the
logical consistency of certainty equivalence and observed
diversification, Markowitz practically precludes non
diversifying behavior.

Correlations among individual

firms and securities are matters of reason and common
1A
observation.
Therefore, if uncertainty is to be reduced
and overall stability is to be increased, investors will
d i v e r s i f y . A t the theoretical level, Tobin has shown
that, provided it is derived "from a two-parameter family
[ij,,a] of probability distributions,” a rlsk-averter*s
Indifference curve is necessarily concave upward: ”A11
risk-averters are diversifiers; plungers do not exist."

16

Yet, non-diversifying behavior is observable in practice
and capable of Justification in theory.^
^ " A . .. salient feature of security investment is the
correlation among security returns." Markowitz, Portfolio
Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments, p. 5.
15«The fact that security returns are highly corre
lated, but not perfectly correlated, implies that diversi
fication can reduce risk but not eliminate it." Markowitz,
Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Invest
ments, p7 T,
Tobin, "Liquidity Preference as Behavior
Towards Hisk," The Review of Economic Studies, XXV,
No. 67 (February, 1958), ?£7
17"There is a well-known argument against diversi
fication based on Andrew Carnegie's maxim: 'Put all your
eggs in one basket and watch the basket.*" Benjamin Graham,
David L. Dodd, sued Sidney Cottle, Security Analysis (^th ed.
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962), p7"~557~"Dlversification is a necessity for the beginner. But those who
have experience and are capable of running risks have a
better chance of getting rich by not diversifying."
G. M. Loeb, The Battle for Investment Survival (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 11.
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4.

The 'St. Petersburg Paradox' Considered

An increasingly accepted approach to the explana
tion of decision-making under uncertainty postulates
18
(expected) utility,
not the expected value of monetary
gain (return) or certainty equivalence, maximization as
the criterion of individual choice under uncertainty.
The classic demonstration is due to the Bernoulli family
19
and is widely known;
A "rational" man is offered the
chance to flip a coin until the event "heads" appears.
Should it appear on the first throw, he receives $1.
Should it appear on the second, third, fourth, ..., nth
throw, he receives $2 , $4, $8 , ..., (,|2 )

, respectively.

What is the amount of money the outright receipt of
which a reasonable man would consider equivalent to the
privilege of playing this game on the receiving side?
■*-®The use of the term "utility" throughout will
refer to the utility of "acts" and not to the utility of
"consequences" as the term has been traditionally used in
economics. The use of the term in the former sense is due
to John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior (3d ed.; Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
University Press, 1953). In the older, more traditional
sense, utility was a probability-less conception.
Thus,
economists referred not only to the utility of money, but
also to the utility of (certain) consequences such as
commodities (and services) and combinations of commodities
(i.e., patterns of consumption). This probability-less
conception of utility has now been discredited in the eyes
of most economists. See Leonard J. Savage, The Founda
tions of Statistics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
i95*0, PP. 93-96.
Bernoulli, "Exposition of a New Theory on the
Measurement of Risk," Papers of the Imperial Academy of
Science, V (Petersburg, 1738), trans. L. Sommer, Eoonome’
farloa, 22, No. 1 (January, 195*0, 23-36.

The expected monetary value of such a game,
assuming the coin to be fair, is computed as follows:
CO

CO

v = t|1 d ) t (2 )t"1 = £

= *•

One might therefore expect a reasonable, expected mone
tary gain maximizer to prefer the privilege of playing
this game to the (certain) receipt of any finite amount
of money!

It is intuitively obvious, however, that no

reasonable man would do so; hence, the "St. Petersburg
Paradox" of Nicholas Bernoulli.

20

In the first published resolution of the paradox
formulated by his older cousin, Daniel Bernoulli stated
the problem in an alternative way:

How much, he asks,

might one expect a reasonable man to pay for the privi
lege of playing such a game?

The answer for an expected

monetary gain maximizer is, again, virtually any finite
amount.

Why, then, asks Bernoulli, are players so scarce

at twenty (or even ten) dollars a game?
Numerous answers are possible.
very small probability of long series.

Some emphasize the
91

The probability

20por an extended discussion, see William Fellner,
Probability and Profit (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1965), pp. 101-108; for a specific formula
tion of the paradox as it relates to the appraisal of
securities with growth prospects, see David Durand,
"Growth Stocks and the Petersburg Paradox," Journal of
Finance, XII, No. 3 (September, 1957), 348-35J7
21

D*Alembert contends that "very long runs are not
only very improbable, but do not occur at all." Quoted in
J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London: The
Macmillan Company, 1921), p. 3l7. Or as Keynes remarked:
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of twenty successive tails, for instance,

p20 = <*)20.
equals 0 . 9 5 3 7 { 1 0 ~ ) , if the coin Is fair.

Others

emphasize the inevitably finite resources of the offerer.
Even a fairly short series of tails would break a moderate
pp
bank.
Sould the bank’s resources be limited to one
million dollars, for example, the twentieth consecutive
tail would break it.

The potential monetary payoffs for

tails thrown beyond that limit are meaningless.

The

game’s meaningful expected value under such a constraint
becomes
V = 4(19) = $9.50,
considerably less than an infinite amount.
But, the above discussed considerations notwith
standing, the St. Petersburg paradox lies, most critics
are generally agreed, in the symmetrical treatment of
possible outcomes by the expected monetary gain maximiza
tion criterion, in its assumption of proportionality
between money and utility.

Bernoulli, for example,

contends that $20 (say) is not, but is less than, twenty
times as valuable to an individual as $1.

So, certainly,

is $20 million less than twenty times as valuable as
"In the long run we are all dead." And this would seem
especially so in the infinitely long run.

22Ibld.

$1 million.

At the other extreme, is a loss of $10,000

exactly twice as unpleasant as a loss of

Or,

stated otherwise, what is the value to an investor of
the dollar that stands between himself and financial
ruin?

Clearly, the utility to an investor of each dollar

23
of his wealth is not the. same. ^

A symmetrical treatment

of the value of one's first and last unit of wealth fails
to explain the behavior of a person who insures or
diversifies or refuses to stake his fortune on the
St. Petersburg game.

Our rejection of expected monetary

gain maximization as a choice criterion is firmly
established in reason and observation.
In the development of a surrogate theory of choice
under uncertainty, Bernoulli suggests that the monetary
value of a person’s wealth is not its true, or "moral,"
worth to him.

Accordingly, he postulates that persons

seek to maximize the expected value of "moral" worth,
or "moral expectation."

And he argues further that a

fixed increment of money wealth typically results in an
even smaller increment of moral wealth as the basic
monetary wealth to which the increment applies is
increased.
Operationally, as it concerns behavior in the face
23"lt seems apparent that, unlike Gertrude Stein's
'A Rose is a Rose is a Rose,* a dollar is not a dollar
without regard for the number of its fellows." Farrar,
op. olt., p. 11; "Only the miser is like the mathemati
cian : both of them esteem money in proportion to its
numeric quantity." Buffon, "Essai d'Arithmetic Morale,"
quoted in Keynes, loo, olt.

of uncertainty, moral expectation is expectation of
utility, stripped of any hedonistic (pleasure-pain)
interpretation.

Daniel Bernoulli’s resolution of his

cousin's famous paradox rests, therefore, upon the prin
ciple of diminishing marginal utility of wealths that the
marginal utility to an investor of money gains diminishes
oh,
as his expected monetary gains rise. ^ In mathematical
terms, the individual's utility function for wealth is
concave from below.

While the declining probability of

increasingly late first appearances of heads in the St.
Petersburg game i_s fully offset by increasingly large
monetary payoffs, it is not fully offset by steeply
rising aggregate utility payoffs.

And what is relevant

to an actor's choice is the utility of monetary payoffs.
The noneonvergent progression which represents the
expected monetary value of the game is replaced by a
progression expressing the utility equivalents of poten
tial monetary payoffs.

Because one's marginal utility

for monetary gains is taken to decrease (monotonically),
the St. Petersburg game yields a convergent

progression.2^

We are led to a criterion which postulates that an actor
chooses to allocate his wealth among alternatives so as
to maximize his "expected utility," the mathematical
expectation of utility gains to himself.
2^Savage , ojd. olt. . pp. 93-9^.
25pellner, 0£. olt., p. 102.
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5.

Operational Utility

Daniel Bernoulli did not attempt to specify further
the nature of the utility functions for money of individ
uals by examining what amounts of money with certainty
they would actually consider the equivalents of various
prospects under uncertainty.

Nor was the St. Petersburg

game suitable for experimental reproduction, since, as we
have noted, it is essential to the operation of the game
that the offerer be able (or, at least, thought to be
able) to pay out money without limit.

The operational

formulation remained to Ramsey, ^

Friedman-Savage,2^
pO
and particularly to von Neumann-Morgenstern.
Their
research, which begins by formulating axioms of which the
maximization of the mathematical expectation of utility
is a corollary, has shown that it is possible to derive
generalizations about a person’s utility for money that
are consistent with logic and the observations of repeated
decisions.

In a most important contribution, they demon

strate that it is possible to associate the unambiguous
concept of expected monetary values with some arbitrary
2^Frank Plumpton Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathe
matics and Other Logical Essays (New York: HarcourFJ
Brace and Company, i9jii )•
2?Milton Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Utility
Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," Readings in Price
Theory (eds. George J. Stigler and Kenneth E. Bouldlng;
Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1952), pp. 57-96.
pp
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern,
op. clt.
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index of a decision-maker’s utility.

It is therefore

possible for us to contemplate not only how a complex
set of alternative investments might be reduced to a set
of expected monetary gains and losses, as we have done,
but to demonstrate how such a set of expected outcomes
might be transformed into utility measures for purposes
of decision-making.

We require, therefore, to develop

the concept of an individual’s utility function for
cashable wealth.
Consider, then, an individual who confronts an
alternative A^ which promises two different consequences,
zero dollars and some positive number of dollars xlt with
equal case probabilities.

Assign an arbitrary index to

each monetary amount, the only restriction being that the
index for the x^ number of dollars be greater than the
index for zero dollars.

We may conceive of a number of

such choices and arrive at a utility index of the form,
U(x^) = some number,
representing the individual's utility index for any amount
of money.

Though it is not necessary, for convenience,

choose U(0) = 0 (to be read: ”The utility of zero dollars
is zero” ), as the arbitrary zero point on the utility
scale.

Now select arbitrarily U(x^) = 1 (to be read:

•'The utility of x ^ ) dollars is 1” ).

The expected utility

of alternative A^ is the sum of the utility assignments
to the possible consequences, weighted by the appropriate
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probabilities:
e [u (a 1 )]

= Kn(o)] + K u U i ) ] ,

= £(o) + i d )
= i
Now, formulate an alternative to A^, which yields
some amount of money with certainty, A 2 .

Accordingly as

the individual prefers A2 to Alf U(A2 ) > U(A^) = i, the
utility of A 2 on our scale is greater than §.

Continue

to formulate alternatives until for some alternative A^,
which promises some certain amount x 2 , the individual
considers An as attractive as A^ (that is, he is
indifferent between these alternatives).

Thus, the

utility assignment to x'
2 dollars should be:

U(x2) = iCU(O)] + §[u(xi)]
= i
Additional utility evaluations for sums of money
between zero and x^ dollars could be made in a similar
manner, each time finding the sum which must be offered
with certainty to make the individual indifferent to the
uncertain prospect.

A consistent measure for sums in

excess of x^ dollars may be derived from a comparable
process, as may the (dis)utility index to be assigned
to losses of dollar amounts.

Any number of utility-money

pairs may be induced in this general fashion.

These are

said to comprise the individual's utility function for
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money wealth, U(x).
It will be clear that the scale of such a function
and Its origin are arbitrarily determined.2^

For a given

individual, utility functions formulated on the basis of
different scales and zero points would result in identical
decisions among given alternatives.

For a given utility

function, we could add a oonstant to each utility index,
or multiply each by a constant, and maintain the ordering
capability of the original function.

If c and k are

constants, we may compute
Ua (x ) = c + k U (x ).
Ua (x) can serve as well as U(x) as a representation of
the utility function of the Individual at hand.

But it

is clearly improper to compare the utility schedules of
individuals.

The utility function of any person depends

upon preferences alone and is uniquely individual.

It

is not open to further analysis or refutation.
6.

General Specification of the Individual's
Utility of Wealth Function

Considerations of scale and comparability aside,
we may draw certain reasoned generalizations concerning
an individual's utility function for cashable (money)
29The utility function, in other words, is measur
able up to a linear transformation.
See A. A. Alchian,
"The Meaning of Utility Measurement," American Economic
Review, XLIII, No. 1 (March, 1953), pp. 26-50

w e a l t h . p o r example, Inasmuch as wealth is generally
desirable, an individual will prefer more wealth to less.
The utility measure of a given stock of wealth may be
supposed to be greater than that of any lesser stock.
That is: the utility function will rise over any relevant
range of wealth.

Since the slope of the function is

defined as the ratio of an incremental change in the
utility index as a result of an incremental change in
wealth, other things constant, we may restate the pre
ceding condition to read: the individual's utility
function for wealth has positive slope over any relevant
range:

This measure corresponds to an individual's marginal
utility of wealth.
It is reasonable to regard the marginal utility
of wealth as relatively unaffected by "small” changes in
one's wealth.

Alternatively stated, for "small" changes

^Conjectures at,out the individual's utility func
tion supported by empirical observations were first made
by Milton Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Utility Analysis
of Choices Involving Risk," Journal of Political Economy,
LVI, No. ^ (August, 19^8), 279-3^; reprinted with a
correction in Readings in Price Theory, loo, olt. Our
development follows that of Harry Markowitz, "The Utility
of Wealth," Journal of Political Economy, LX, No. 2
(April, 1952},
"which explains what the F-S
hypothesis explains, avoids the contradiction with common
observation to which the F-S hypothesis is subject, and
explains still other phenomena concerning behavior under
uncertainty." Ibid., p. 152.

in the wealth of an individual, his utility function
over that range has approximately constant slope and may
he taken as linear.

Now, if an individual’s utility

function is strictly linear, he will maximize expected
utility by maximizing the mathematical expectation of
monetary gains in wealth.

For such persons, expected

monetary gain will guide decision-making.

But, for large

variations in the wealth of an Individual, this condition
is unlikely.

It is observable that in the choice among

alternatives, the one that gives rise to the highest
expected value is not invariably preferred.

The mathe

matically expected value is, after all, only partially
descriptive of the appraised alternative to which it
refers.

A familiar example of situations in which it is

observable that persons frequently choose the alternative
which does not have the highest expected value is provided
by insurance, since insurance premiums are invariably
o

greater than the expected value of the loss in wealth
insured against.

The tendency of persons to insure
31
against losses (and to diversify portfolios)
is
explained by a utility of wealth function which is con
cave from below for some range of wealth below present
wealth.
3*Markowitz has shown that " ...if an individual's
utility curve is strictly concave, diversification between
two equally good portfolios cannot produce a worse port
folio and generally will produce a better one." Markowitz,
Portfolio Selection; Efficient Diversification of Invest
ment, p. 216"

The desire to avoid danger (to insure against
significant losses) seems, however, to be at work in
persons simultaneously with a desire to court danger.
Many of the same persons who insure against losses also
buy lottery tickets.

Or, to state the relevant analogy,

some of the same investors who diversify are observed to
include in their portfolios highly speculative electronics
and mining shares.

Persons therefore reveal a willingness

to accept risky alternatives which promise a small chance
of "relatively large" gains in return for modest invest
ments, even though the mathematical expectation of gain
may make the "gamble" an "unfair" one.

The observed

willingness of persons to accept unfair bets is explained
by a utility of wealth function which is convex from
below for some range of wealth above present wealth; that
is, over some range of expected gains in wealth.
Furthermore, though the slope of the utility
function for wealth of an Individual may be supposed to
increase sharply as the amount of losses increases,
implying the proportionately larger disutility of large
losses in wealth, the slope of the function may be
supposed to decrease after some point of "financial ruin,"
beyond which further losses no longer "really matter" to
the individual.

This is to say that the Individual’s

utility of wealth function is bounded from below for
"very large" losses in wealth.
In sum, these observations enjoin a general view of

the individual's utility of wealth function as neither
everywhere concave or everywhere convex, but concave for
some range of wealth below present wealth, then convex
for a range of wealth above present wealth to an
"aspiration level" of w e a l t h , t h e n concave again, and
generally bounded in the extremes, as that in Figure 3-1.
Such a curve is consistent with Insurance against losses
(and diversification), gambling, and because it is bounded
from above, avoids the St. Petersburg Paradox.

The

hypothesized curve is consistent with the existence of
actuarily "unfair" Insurance and actuarily "unfair"
lotteries.

Because people are observed to avoid sym

metric bets, the curve is assumed to fall faster to the
left of the origin (given by the level of present wealth)
than it rises to the right of the origin.

The individ-

"will take large chances of a small loss for a small
chance for a large gain."3^

Moreover, the hypothesis

Implies essentially the same behavior for a person
whether he is rich or poor, except the location of the
utility function's inflection points, and therefore the
meanings of "small" and "large" or "very large," will
32por a contextual discussion of the concept of
"aspiration level," see Sidney Siegel, "Level of Aspira
tion and Decision Making," Psychological Review, LXIV,
No. if (July, 1957), 253-262.
■^I.e., U(x1 ) > |U (—x)| , for x^ > 0 .
^Markowitz, "The Utility of Wealth," p. 155.

0 = present

w ealth

Figure 3-1. A Utility of Wealth Function Consistent with Riskaversion (insurance and Diversification) and Risk-taking
(Gambling and Speculation), which Avoids the St. Peters
burg Paradox.

differ.35, 36
35Ibid.
3 % o t e that this specification of the individual
investor’s utility of wealth function is general. We
acknowledge the observed existence of "risk-lover" and
"risk-averters" in the market for securities and
generally.

CHAPTER IV
INVESTMENT VALUATION AND PORTFOLIO SELECTION
1.

Introduction

We have established the nature of investor expecta
tions as involving subjective probability distributions
over future sets of events, the envisioned possible
future monetary gains and losses on securities in which
commitments of funds are considered.

An investor's

reaction to these possible outcomes is reflected in his
utility function for cashable wealth which, as we have
shown, provides a personalistic evaluation of the uncer
tainty inherent in investing (or betting) decisions.
The processes of Investment valuation and portfolio
selection by which an individual will allocate the
current monetary equivalent of those investment assets
which currently comprise his wealth among alternative
security investments may now be demonstrated.
2.

The Expected Utility of
Alternative Investments

Suppose an individual considers an investment I in
a specific security S.

He attaches subjective probability

weights to the possible future monetary values of this
commitment in S.

Given a current (or appraised) price
77
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(or set of prices) of S, the probability weights of
expected gains and losses on the investment follow by
inference.

Such ex ante monetary gains and losses may be

supposed to have utility expressions.

Accordingly, let

U(x) represent the utility measure attaching to the
appraised probable monetary gains and losses (x) on an
investment I in some number i of a given security S, the
investor’s appraisal of ex ante gains and losses on
which is given by the probability density function
fs(x; E, E2 , E3 , E4 , ..., En ).
The probabilistic prospect of monetary gains in
wealth may be supposed to represent some positive
to the Investor.

utility

On the other hand, the probabilistic

prospect of monetary losses in wealth may be supposed to
represent some disutility to the investor.

Generally, the

appraised investment prospect may be supposed to have a
net utility representation, Un , which combines the positive
utilities of expected gain outcomes and the disutilities
_of expected loss outcomes on the investment, weighted by
their respective case probabilities:
Un = U(x)fs(x; iE, i2E2 , i3E3 , i4E^, ..., lnEn )dx.
Now, IJn relates to the end of the investment period
or horizon.

It is required therefore that this measure

ke discounted to obtain the present net expected utility
of alternative investment commitments.

If the Investor

is indifferent between the utility measure 1 now and the
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utility measure (1+r) at the end of the investment
horizon, the present utility to the investor of the net
expected utility of the investment under consideration
is given by

The present net expected utility Up of alternative
investment commitments in S (and R, T,
similarly computed.

N) may be

Given the general specification of

the investor's utility of wealth function as concave
(from below) for significant loss outcomes, and first
convex and then concave for significant gain outcomes,
specification of present net expected utility Up for
alternative commitments in S (that is, as a function of
I) depends upon f g(x; E, E2 , E^, E^, ..., En).

For

concreteness, assume that an investor expects with
relative certainty a substantial rise in the price of
security S over the investment planning period (that is,
attaching moderate variance and moderate positive skew
ness to the probability distribution of ex ante gains and
losses on the security).

The present net expected utility

°f one such security S will be positive and increase at
an increasing rate over some relevant (initial) range
as I Increases, reflecting the increasing variance and
positive skewness of I over the range of U(x) exhibiting
rising marginal utility of wealth.

As larger and larger
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commitments in S are considered, however, the increasing
disutility of ex ante losses on the investment and the
decreasing marginal utility of ex ante gains on the
investment may be supposed to mitigate the rise in
net expected utility (and therefore in present net
expected utility) of investments in S.

After increasing

at an increasing rate over some initial range of I, Up
increases at a decreasing rate over some range of I,
reaches a maximum, and falls.

The preceding arguments

are summarized geometrically in Figure 4-1, with the
investment commitment in S associated with a maximum
total utility to the investor designated I*.
3.

Investment Valuation and Portfolio Selection
Generally, if present net expected utility (Up ) is

negative for all levels of I considered, the security in
question will be dropped from additional consideration.
An investor will require to select from among those re
maining securities for which Up > 0 for some levels of I.
He will do so in a fashion consistent with the objective
of expected utility maximization.
Define, then, marginal present net expected utility
as
—

j

dl
where I denotes the monetary investment in some security
currently under consideration.

To maximize the sum of the
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Figure 1|— 1. The Present Wet Expected Utility to an
Investor of Alternative Investment Commitments
in a Given (Appraised) Security.
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present net expected utilities of his investment
holdings, an investor will appraise the marginal present
net expected utility m for each of the set of remaining
securities

for some initial small increment of invest

ment.He will

allocate the increment to the security

under consideration with the highest (positive) marginal
present net expected utility.

This process Is then

continued until either:
(a) the marginal present net expected utili
ties

for all eligible securities are zero.

At

this point the sum of the present net expected
utilities is at a maximum, and the commitment of
funds to securities will cease.

If investible

funds remain, the utility to the Investor of
holding this amount of "speculative” cash is
greater than that obtainable through its commit
ment to the purchase of any available security;
or
(b) the investor’s wealth is fully committed
to securities and
mA ~ mB == •• • = mN
for securities A, B,

N, the marginal present

net expected utilities of the appraised securities
1

are equal.
1

At this theoretical point of equilibrium,

The actual indivisibility, or "lumpiness," of securi
ties as units of investment may prevent strict equality
between the terms. Also, the investor may decide, as the

no further changes in the investor’s portfolio will
increase his present utility.
If there are few eligible securities (that is, if
mg > 0 for few securities), as might be the case if the
investor expected a general market decline or possessed
an unusually high personal discount rate, the investor
would hold most of his wealth in cash or money substi
tutes.

On the other hand, if there are many securities

with positive marginal present net expected utilities,
the individual’s wealth may be fully committed to some
combination of securities, or even to a single security
for which the investor's expectations are especially
bright.

In any case, the Investment valuations of persons

are determined as preferences for strictly limited quanti
ties of given securities at current (or appraised) prices
and (perhaps) for a specific residual of cash or moneysubstitutes.

The individual's portfolio of security

Investments is determined and its selection may proceed
in the market: new securities may be added; current
holdings may be increased or decreased.

But in every case

the consequence of valuation is the determination of the
investor's market inclinations in respect of given
allocation process proceeds, to buy two or more blocks of
the same security. The order of allocation may be 100
shares of A common, 100 of B, 50 more of A, and so on.
Only the strictly marginal purchase of A appears in the
term for A above. See James W. Angell, "Uncertainty,
Likelihoods and Investment Decisions," Quarterly Journal
of Economics. LXXIV, No. 1 (February, 1966J", 26-211

8iJ>
securities: to buy, to sell, or to hold strictly
determined quantities at current or appraised prices.
A Note on the Rationality of Investor Choices
The extent to which the use of mathematical notions
has been convenient in the development of our topic makes
it propitious that we note explicitly the inherent
rationality of human thought and action, specifically
in the process of choice among alternative Investment
2
actions.
An investor, we have said, will require to
form reasoned expectations of the potentials of alterna
tive investment commitments.

These he will evaluate in

the light of his utility for uncertain monetary pros
pects.

As antecedent processes, he may enter into the

most elaborate retrospective, contemporary, and future
calculations.

He may, but he need not.

He is not

obliged to go through the lengthy processes of searching
for alternative actions, of building up his knowledge of
facts and relationships, of carefully appraising and
evaluating each alternative before making his selections
and committing his resources.

For to do so involves

^While the term "rationality" is used with varying
references, we adopt a view of rationality as a general
quality of human action and "regard all failures of actions
to attain expected ends as a result of lack of knowlege,
unforeseen events, conflicts of ends, and the like, each
open to further analysis." Raymond J. Chambers, Accounting,
Evaluation and Economic Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.T
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. ^6 . "Human action is
necessarily always rational." Ludwig von Mises, Human
Action (3d. rev. ed.; Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,
1966), p. 18.
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sacrifices, generally of time and effort, and often
specifically of other valued considerations, which he
may consider greater than the increased effectiveness of
choice he expects as a result of doing so.

And in every

case the function of knowledge and of reasoning is not to
increase the rationality of action, but to increase the
effectiveness of choice; to increase the accuracy with
which probabilities are assessed and ascribed to the
ranges of possible consequences of alternative courses
of action; to Increase an actor’s opportunity for optimal
choice and adaptation.
In particular, if an investor chooses among alterna
tive securities on the basis of some random or mechanical
process, he is no less rational than another who chooses
only after the most lengthy deliberation.

A random

selection entails two things: that the investing actor
is saved delay in taking action and that his expectations
of alternative courses of action in the then state of his
knowledge do not warrant the effort of his choosing by
other means.^
Moreover, we have argued that valuation inevitably
contemplates the future, that security valuation is sub
jective and personal, that the criteria for choosing
among alternative security Investments are all hypotheticals arising from expectations and personal utilities.
Now, it may be argued that choice may utilize objective
3Ibid., pp. ^ 5-^6 .

1

criteria that are able to be measured.

For example,

among alternative common shares one may choose that
which sells currently at the least present price to
present earnings multiple, that which has the highest
rate of price growth, or still other criteria which may
be measured and are matters of fact.
clearly mistaken.

But this notion is

Present criteria of choice simply

represent a subtle mode of anticipation.

They assume

that the current state of affairs will extend into the
h,
future.
Additionally, one may conceive of the "value” of
a security (or firm) as eventually capable of objective
measurement and, hence, of "verification,” when the firm
has paid its last dividend and the last share has been
traded.^

This notion is mistaken on three important

grounds.

First, it neglects the fact that valuation is

a personal process.

To say that, over its life, a

security earned so many dollars is to comment objectively
on what it earned.

It is, however, no comment at all

^This is, of course, the famous Keynesian "conven
tion” of "assuming that the existing state of affairs
will continue indefinitely, except as we have specific
reasons to expect a change.” John Maynard Keynes, The
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
(New York: Earcourt, Brace and Company, 193&), P. 152.
•^''Concerning [a stock's] true worth...time only
will tell. Time will not give its answer all at once,
though, but only slowly, word by word, as the years go
by; nor will the last word be spoken till the corporation
shall have closed its books for ever and ever."
John Burr Williams, The Theory of Investment Value
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1938), p. 1i .

87
as to Its worth.

Value does not exist apart from the

private utility of a personal referent, ah actor who acts
or contemplates action in respect of a security (or firm).
Value therefore exists only in the contemplation of what
a firm or security will earn.
Secondly, it will be recalled that valuation is
essentially a present process.

Valuations are conceived

in a given context at a given moment in respect of an
appraised future.

One may not know with certainty the

cash flow a firm or security will generate or the manner
in which those flows will be distributed through time.
The effect of uncertainty notwithstanding, one’s time
preference for money will influence one’s present
valuation of future dollars, and as this structure of
time preferences for money may be supposed to vary interpersonally at a given moment and lntrapersonally through
time, the value of a given (assumed certain) stream of
money will likewise vary.
Thirdly and conclusively, expectations of monetary
gains and losses on securities can be held only with
greater or lesser degrees of probability, never with
certainty.

The likelihoods with which expected gains and

losses are vested will vary among persons whose knowledge
and experience may be expected to differ and for a given
person through time as one’s knowledge and experience
alter.

Additionally, the willingness to assume risks

and the capacity to accomodate doubts induced by uncer

tainty will differ for different persons and for a given
person through time.

CHAPTER V
THE THEORY OP PRICE DETERMINATION
IN SECURITIES MARKETS
1.

Introduction

It is significant that the investment valuations
of persons subsist as only more or less Intensely felt
preferences for some commitments at given current (or
appraised) prices.

Stated otherwise, security valuation,

as a process, is Intensive and subjective, consisting in
current preferences for holding one’s wealth in alterna
tive forms.

In Juxtaposition to the character of invest

ment valuations as subjective and intensive, the character
of security prices, as determined in the market by the
interaction of supply and demand, is objective and
extensive.

We require a theory of market price determi

nation which makes explicit the process by which security
prices are determined and transformed in the market.
2.

The Concepts of Market and
Market Participation

Now, one may refer to the specific complex of insti
tutions and operations by which sellers make offerings
and buyers make bids and through which the issue and
exchange of securities take place as "the securities
89

market."

Considered in this way, the market in securities

is a subset of the market in commodities and services
generally and may itself be further subdivided.

We speak,

for example, of "the stock market" and "the bond market."
But these observations in respect of markets in securities
are of a technical character only; a market is simply an
arrangement by which exchanges are facilitated; it need
1
have neither specific location nor distinctive form.
Moreover, what is described in the vernacular as "the
market for a particular security" denotes an organiza
tional process.

To speak in this way of a process is

metaphorical, however, for to do so is to vest the intan
gible, even ephemeral, inclinations of interested individ
uals to take action in respect of a homogeneous asset
with implied physical (perhaps even static) existence.
Nonetheless, it represents a convenience of terminology
too great to forgo, and we shall speak hereafter without
restraint of "the market for" a given security.
In this fashion we may speak of "the market for
Stock S," "the market for Bond B," and the like.

The

market for Security X will be comprised of those individ
uals who entertain effective inclinations in respect of
Security X; of those who entertain preferences with
respect to Security X which they are both willing and
able (neither alone is sufficient) to uphold with or
^Raymond J. Chambers, Accounting, Evaluation and
Economic Behavior (Englewood dliffs. N. J . : PrenticeSalT, K c 7 ; m ' 6 ) , P. 67.

against offers of general purchasing power.

We may

define market participation therefore in terms of an
individual's effective inclination to take action in
respect of a security: to buy, to sell, or to hold.
Note that it is necessary to participation in the market
for a security that one's inclination be at least poten
tially effective.

That is, one inclined to act in respect

of a security must be able to uphold his Inclination with
or against currency as a generally accepted medium of
exchange.

That a pauper values' GM above its current

price does not place him in the market for GM common.
He is entitled to his opinion; he may express it to his
confidants or publicly and thereby, as his opinion is
regarded, affect the participation of others in the market
for GM; but he cannot give it specific effect himself.
3.

The Process of Market Price Determination

The Inclination of a market participant to take
action in respect of a security derives from his sub
jective valuations.

The differing valuations of partici

pants in the market for a specific security then determine
the price at which any trade occurs,

It follows that

all prices are outcomes of individuals preferring a to
b, of market participants choosing at a definite time
and place under definite conditions between a strictly
limited quantity of some given security and a strictly
limited quantity of some other security or of
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dollars.2

Now, in an occasional act of barter, or the

direct exchange of securities for securities, the ratio
of exchange is only broadly determined.

All that one is

able to assert with regard to such exchanges is that they
can be effected only if each participant to the exchange
values what he receives more highly than what he sacri
fices.

But the existence of money as a generally accepted

medium of exchange and unit of account in which exchange
ratios are measured provides the basis of indirect exchange
which divides transactions into two different parts: sale
and purchase.

Each party to a transaction attaches a

higher value to what he purchases them to what he sells,
to what he receives them to what he gives up.

It follows

that all prices are the product of a discrepemcy in valua
tion, not the product of em equality of valuation.3

If

the seller of so memy securities did not value so much
"The valuations and choices that result in the
exchange ratios of the market do not decide between gold
and iron. Acting man is not in a position in which niT
must choose between all the gold and all the iron. He
chooses at a definite time and place under definite con
ditions between a strictly limited quantity of gold and
a strictly limited quantity of iron." Ludwig von Mises,
Human Action (3d rev. ed.; Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,
1966), p. 121.
3 "The general principle underlying exchange is that
for exchange to occur, two or more individuals must place
different relative valuations on the goods Involved."
Richard H. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allo
cation (3d ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
Inc., 1966), p. 58; "The basis of modern economics is
the cognition that it is precisely the disparity in the
value attached to the objects exchanged that results in
their being exchanged." von Mises, 0£. cit., p. 204.

money (for Itself or as a means to other purchases) more
highly than so many securities, he would not engage in
the transaction; if the purchaser of the securities
(seller of so much money) did not value so many securiL.
ties more highly than so much money, he would not.
The recurrence of acts of exchange and the increase
in the number of participants making bids and offers in
the market narrow the margins between the valuations of
parties.

Indirect exchange, together with the (practi

cally) unlimited divisibility of money, then makes it
possible to establish the exchange ratios of securities
with nicety as money prices determined between extremely
narrow margins: "the valuations on the one hand of the
marginal buyer and those of the marginal offerror who
abstains from selling, and the valuations on the other
hand of the marginal seller and those of the marginal
potential buyer who abstains from b u y i n g . B u t the
valuations of persons, we have said, are transient,
continually altering as information is received and inter
preted.

As expectations and valuations change, the

fa

"A very common mistake on the part of many people
is to think that one of the parties to a voluntary trans
action gains while the other loses.
In any voluntary
exchange of goods among individuals, all parties to the
exchange increase their satisfaction.
It is the prospect
of gain that causes voluntary exchange to occur."
Leftwich, op. olt., p. 57; "...if cost is value there is
no explanation of why an event should be desired."
Chambers, 0£. olt., p. 73.
5von Mises, 0£. olt., p. 327.

9^
eagerness of persons to buy or to sell, or to refrain
from buying or selling, Is affected, bids and offers alter,
transactions occur, and prices change.

Rising and falling

markets reflect widespread changing valuations, with heavy
volume indicative of large amounts of "switching" trans
actions as investors switch out of owned securities or
cash and into others or cash.^
k.

Prices as Measurements

Whereas valuations arise from the anticipations and
utilities of individuals and are subjective and intensive,
prices arise from the interaction of supply and demand in
the market and are objective and extensive.

Prices and

changes in prices derive from the interactions of the
judgments of all buyers and sellers for a security.
Whether one buys or not, prices are objective measure
ments.?

They measure at a given time and place the

number of monetary units which could have been substituted
for the quantity of specific securities-to which they are
assigned.

But the price of a share says nothing very

precise about the personal evaluations of a share by any
individual investor.

An actual price merely expresses

^R. G. E. Smith, "The ’Marginal Opinion' Theory of
Stock Price," Financial Analysts Journal, 23» No. 6
(November-Deeember, 196?), 130; John Burr Williams, The
Theory of Investment Value (Boston: Harvard University
Press, T ? 3 ^ T 7 ~ P P T T 7 - ^
n

fCf. von Mises: "...prices are not measured in
money; they consist in money." Og. olt., p. 217.
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the fact that a buyer is, or was, willing to forgo title
to so much money, and a seller is, or was, willing to
forgo title to so many securities at the stated ratio
or price.

An actual price is not necessarily the

minimum which the seller would accept or the maximum
Q
which the buyer would be prepared to pay.
Nor does a past or present price say anything
directly valid about the price or prices at which a
security will trade at any point in the future.

As an

actual price is the resultant of conditions of supply and
demand in the market at a given point of time, all prices
require to be dated.

Actual prices are past and present;

future prices, however, are hypotheticals.

One may

utilize past and present prices and rates of change in
prices in the development of reasoned expectations about
future prices, but future prices are not themselves
capable of measurement.9

One may know beyond any doubt

a past or present price; one may only speculate as to
a future price.
It follows from the character of any price as the
resultant of mass causes in a given context that there
can be no justification for assuming that an actual price
®Cf. above, pp. 91-93*
9"...never do we say that we are measuring the value
of a quantity at a future time, even though it may be
possible to predict that value on the basis of a measure
ment made at present." Henry Margenau, The Nature of
Physical Reality (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1959), P. 37*K
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is not a "normal" or "true" price.

A man may conceive

of the value of a security to himself; he may conceive
of a (hypothetical) price at which he expects a security
to sell at some future time; however, he may not conceive
of a "normal" or "true" price for the security.

There

are no other prices than those yielded by the market,
however thick or thin, perfect or Imperfect.
5.

10

An^Imaginary Construction of the Market

It is possible (and fashionable) to visualize the
interaction of valuations in the market by which price is
determined by drawing demand and supply curves, whose
intersection shows the equilibrium or market-clearing
price.

11

Elsewhere
we have suggested (following
12
Williams)
that market participants entertain notions
of appraised (hypothetical) prices at which they will
buy or sell shares.1-^

At any moment, then, the extant

"Any price determined
on the
_
jrowth of the interplay
of the forces operating, that is, demand and supply.
Whatever the market situation which generated this price
may be, with regard to it the price is always adequate,
genuine, and real.
It cannot be higher if no bidder
ready to offer a higher price turns up, and it cannot be
lower if no seller ready to deliver at a lower price
turns up. Only the appearance of such people ready to buy
or to sell can alter prices." von Mises, o|>. olt., p. 396.
^Smith, 0£. olt., pp. 127-132.
12Williams, o£. olt., Chp. 3*
*^a vast literature ex.ists-^wMch treats the methods
of analysis by which such hypothetical "buy" and "sell"
prices are formulated. See, generally, Donald E. Vaughn,
Survey of Investments (New York: Holt, Rinehart and

97
quantity of a given security will be in the possession
of certain people (owners).

Other people (also market

participants) have preferences for definite quantities
at definite prices.

We can therefore draw the usual

downward sloping demand curve which shows the readiness
of buyers to take various quantities at various hypo
thetical prices.

Ordinarily this demand curve would be

met in the market by an upward-sloping supply curve of
the potential sellers of a product.

The situation in the

market will thus determine the price by the intersection
of the downward-sloping demand curve on the one hand with
the upward-sloping supply curve on the other.
The traditional upward slope of the market supply
curve derives from the economic theory of production and
costs.

ik

In the case of non-reproducible goods (that is,

those goods fixed in supply), the forces determining the
shape of the owners' (sellers') supply curve are the same
as those which determine the shape of the buyers' demand
curve.

15

Buyers decide whether to buy the shares in

Winston, Inc., 1967); for a detailed presentation of the
methods of technical analysis, see Robert D. Edwards and
John Magee, Technical Analysis of Stock Trends (Spring
field, Mass.: John Magee, 1964); of fundamental analysis,
see Benjamin Graham, David L. Dodd, and Sidney Cottle,
Security Analysis (4th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book
C 6 .7 1 9 6 2 1 7 ^ ----

■^See, for example, Leftwlch, op. olt., Chps. 7» 8 ,
and 9 .
■^The usefulness of the subjectival dichotomy of
"demand" and "supply" depends upon the "empirical
generalization that an enumeration of the forces affecting
demand in any problem and of the forces affecting supply
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question or other shares or goods or simply to hold their
money.

In the same way, owners (potential sellers)

decide whether to hold their shares or to exchange them
for money to hold or as a means to the purchase of other
shares or goods more highly valued .^

The willingness

or reluctance of securityholders to buy or to sell is
therefore determined by the owners*

(sellers*) demand for

their own security holdings.
The existent shares (say) of a given firm are
owned and held by Investors.

The willingness of holders

to sell owned shares is determined by the same processes
of appaisement and valuation as the eagerness of non

will yield two lists that contain few items in common."
Milton Friedman, "The Marshallian Demand Curve," Journal
of Political Economy, LVII, No. 6 (December, 19^9)» 468.
"Now this generalization is valid for markets like.the
final market for a consumer good.
In such a market there
is a clear and sharp distinction between the economic
units that can be regarded as demanding the product and
those that can be regarded as supplying it.... But the
generalization is not always valid. For example, it is
not valid for the day-to-day fluctuations of prices in a
primarily speculative market. Is a rumor of an increased
excess-profits tax, for example, to be regarded as a fac
tor operating primarily on today’s supply of corporate
equities in the stock market or on today’s demand for
them,? In similar fashion, almost every factor can with,
about as much justification be classified under the head
ing ’supply* as under the heading ’demand.'" Milton
Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: The Uni
versity of Chicago Press, 1953)* P» 8 . Hicks properly
observes that the indifference curve approach he uses to
analyze consumer choice is suitable for describing an in
vestor’s tastes only if his expectations of future prices
are independent of present prices. Only in the unlikely
event that people ignore the present prices of securities
in shaping their expectations of future prices will this
condition be satisfied. See J. R. Hicks, Value and
Capital (2d ed.; London: Oxford Univ. Press, 19^6)» p. 56.
l?See above, Chp. IV.
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owners to buy and possess given quantities of shares.
One may suppose, if one chooses, that holders actually
offer their shares for sale in the market, but "buy them
back" at their "reserve" prices.

A decision to sell can

then be expressed as a decision "not to demand."

It is

therefore possible and legitimate to represent the supply
conditions of a good whose supply is fixed not only by
an upward-sloping supply curve, but alternatively, by
a downward-sloping demand curve of securityholders'
for their own shares.1®

In Figure 5-1(a) there is a

fixed supply OQ of a given security.

Supply conditions

are represented by a downward-sloping demand curve of securityholders for their own securities, denoted SOD.
In Figure 5-1 (t>) the securityholders' demand curve for
their own securities (SOD) is added horizontally to the
usual downward-sloping demand curve of buyers, denoted DD.
The curve resulting from the horizontal summation of
DD and SOD constitutes the demand curve of the market as
a whole for the security in point, the broken curve DE.
This "total" demand curve is confronted in the market
18«gvery share of stock demanded can be bought at
some price; every share of stock offered can be sold at
some price. It is merely a continuous auction sale, but
one in which both buyers and sellers are bidding.
In the
usual auction of goods, only the buyers bid for what is
offered, which is then sold to the highest bidder. In the
stock exchange auotion, buyers are bidding but so are
sellers (by offering to sell at a certain reserve price).
The price, of an actual transaction recorded on the ticker
tape is that at which a seller was willing to sell and a
buyer was willing to buy." Edgar S. Genstein, Stock Market
Profit without Forecasting (Larohmont, New York: American
Research douncil, I96I), pp. 11-12.
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Figure 5-1*
(a-) The Demand of Present Holders for a Given Security: Security
holders Own Demand; (b) An Imaginary Construction of the Market for a
Security and of Security Price Determination.
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with the vertical curve QQ, representing the fired supply
of the security in existence.

Price is determined by the

interaction of the combined demand curve DE with the
curve of fixed supply QQ; MP in Figure 5-1 (*>).

The

number of securities bought and sold (transaction volume)
is 0M, and the number of securities not sold is MQ.

It

will be apparent from Figure 5-1 (t>) that when the price
of a security moves, it moves because of a shift in the
market demand curve for that security.

Such a shift

represents changes occurring in the expectations and
valuations of owners and non-owners (but effective market
participants) and in the hypothetical prices at which they
would buy and sell certain quantities of the security in
question.
It is, of course, no less possible (and fashionable)
to describe the market mathematically.

It will be

apparent, however, that mathematical or pictorial modes
of expression "do not affect the essence of our interpretation and that they do not add one whit to our insight."

20

^ " B u t what of the *supply curve' that usually
figures as a determinant of price, co-ordinate with the
demand curve? I say it boldly and baldly: There is no
such thing. When we are speaking of a marketable commod
ity, what is usually called the supply curve is in reality
the demand curve of those who possess the commodity....
The so-called supply curve, therefore, is simply a part
of the total demand curve...." Philip H. Wlcksteed, "The
Scope and Method of Political Economy," The Economic Jour
nal, XXIV (March, 1 9 1 M » p. 13. See also Smith, loo, olt.;
and Williams, loc. cit.
^®von Mises, o£. cit., p. 333.
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Furthermore, It Is possible for these "models" to mis
lead. They Inevitably rest upon simplifying assumptions
which may or may not be made explicit.

They may prove

expedient in helping undergraduates to visualize the
market, but their significance otherwise is trivial.
6.

The Market as a *Black Box'

We have viewed the market for a security as being
comprised of individuals who entertain effective inclina
tions to act in the present in respect of that security,
guided by their differing appraisals and valuations which
are only more or less intensely felt and are continually
being transformed.

The practical complexity of market

systems is therefore immense.

The daily transactions

in the market for many securities are thousandfold; the
perceptions, interpretations, and valuations proximate to
any one of them may be many millions.

As a consequence,

it is almost, if not completely, impossible to visualize
the whole of the processes which contribute to a single
transaction in the market.

This complexity of the market

as an action system requires that it be regarded as a
"black box."

It is definable in principle, but the very

complexity of it defies definition in practice.

We can

know, in principle, what is going on "in there” but we
cannot observe it or test it.

Only the consequences of

all those thousands of decisions which contribute to a
single transaction are capable of measurement and observa
tion:

(dated) prices and volume.

Data as to transaction
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volume and prices In any Interval are to be regarded as
the output of a "black box."
Moreover, we have noted above the nature of an
actual price as indicative of nothing very precise about
the personal evaluations of a security by only variously
informed participants in the market.

An actual price,

we have said, merely expresses that an individual was
willing to forgo title to so many securities for so much
money and another Individual was willing to forgo title
to so much money in exchange for so many securities.
The purchaser evidently valued so many securities more
highly than so much money; the seller, so much money
more highly than so many securities.

But in neither

case are we able to deduce how much is "more."

We are

not able to specify the shape of the market demand curve
for a security.

We are only able to conclude that

owners value their holdings above the current price or
bid; non-owners (but effective market participants),
below the current price or asked quotation.

Only when

the effective valuations of owners and non-owners
"overlap n can a trade occur.

But we can have no know

ledge or experience concerning the shape of market
curves.

Always what we know are (dated) market prices

and trading quantities— not the curves, but only a point
which we may interpret (if we like) as the intersection
of two hypothetical curves.
exist.

But the curves do not

7.

Inputs of Securities Markets

We have spoken above of prices and transaction
volume as the output data of market systems.

We may

regard the input data of markets as the informative
stimuli which induce and alter the differing expectations
and valuations of investing persons which interact in the
market to form prices.

The task of predicting future

market prices reduces to the task of anticipating the
relevant news (financial and otherwise) and of appraising
its composite effect upon the market for a specific
security.

If Investors are to choose other than randomly,

they will require to study the forces at work in the past
and present in those areas considered relevant to their
choice (earnings trends, price trends and configurations,
social, political, and economic forces, for instance) and,
in the light of correlations established in one's experi
ence or of logical relationships justified in one's
reason, to form reasoned expectations which guide actions.
Now, market participants are of varying wills and
capacities.

Information bearing on the prospects of

specific securities is only variously received and vicari
ously interpreted by participants in the market for those
securities.

Always the market for a security Includes

21a "way to forecast the news, and thus...the move
ment of prices, is to study the forces at work, in the
belief that 'coming events cast their shadows before.'
In this spirit of prophecy Keynes wrote his Economic
Consequences of the Peace." Williams, o£. cit., p. 35.

participants who are more and less informed.

Moreover,

it always includes among its members some persons who are
more readily able to interpret and to act upon informa
tion.

Those more informed and more capable participants,

though few in number, may be said to "see the truth
first."

22

Insofar as an item of news is received and

accorded varying significances for the future and thereby
has divergent effects upon the valuations of market
participants, the same Information may induce differing
responses in market participants, different inclinations
to action in respect of a security.

The effects of such

messages generally will be toward a maintenance of current
conditions in the market, or an equilibrium of price
through time, styled a consolidation.

This tendency to

equilibrium is upset to the extent and in the direction
that messages induce similar responses throughout the
market for a security, or throughout the market in the
securities of firms generally.

But even in the case of

news which may be expected to receive general assent
throughout the market as "good" or "bad," substantial
price changes do not occur instantaneously, but only over
some period of time during which the news is thoroughly
disseminated among, and similarly interpreted by, numerous
investors,

if the news is "good," those who receive and

22"Every speculator's life is strewn with regrets,
vain regrets for the news he did not understand until it
was too late." Ibid., p. 37.
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understand it first buy from marginal owners who do not
know enough at the time to change their standing offers
or to refrain from selling as they see the price of the
security move upward.

If the news is "bad," those alert

enough to see it first take advantage this time of
standing bids in the market and of those owners who
abstain from selling as they see the price of the
security move downward. ^
Now, we have heretofore conceived of the market in
securities generally as comprised of many separate mar
kets in the specific securities of firms, each comprised
of participants who entertain effective inclinations to
action in respect of a particular security at a given
time.

We have emphasized especially the ephemeral

character of markets.

As informative stimuli continually

effect changes in expectations and valuations,
the participations of persons in the separate markets
for specific securities may alter, with the same
information having its (practically) simultaneous
effect in all markets.

An investor may, for example,

on news interpreted as favorable to GM relative to Tele
phone, decide to switch out of Telephone at a (given)
current price (bid) and into GM at a (given) current
price (offer), the net effect, other things equal, being
upward pressure on the price of GM and downward pressure

23williams, 0£. cit., pp. 36-37.
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on the price of Telephone.

That investor participations

in the markets for specific securities are mobile and
that investor valuations are transient produces a general
connexlty of securities markets and an integrated struc
ture of securities prices.

It is therefore patently

absurd to look upon a definite security price as though
it were an isolated phenomenon.

What is called a price

is an instantaneous quantitative ratio expressive of a
relationship within an integrated system which is the
composite effect of the current valuations of all
oh.
investing persons.
This general connexity of markets and of prices
is not limited to securities markets and prices; it is
characteristic of speculative markets generally.

For

example, the markets for steel scrap (or titles to steel
scrap) and steel shares tend to turn up at the same
time, for the same news is, in general, relevant to both
markets.

As the same news is generally available to

stock traders and scrap dealers, they may be supposed
ordinarily to decide at the same time that steel
operations are going to increase or decrease.

Moreover,

members of either group are free to trade in the other’s
market if excess differentials should exist between the
two.

It is therefore not to be expected that scrap prices

should move in advance of share prices.

We could variously

restate the preceding argument in terms of the markets for
2^von Mises, 0£. cit., p. 392.
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crude and oil shares, for Interest rates and bank shaires,
or for any set of related speculative markets and for the
structure of speculative prices generally.

The same news

Is reflected at (practically) the same time In all markets;
It is therefore inconceivable that any general scheme
could be devised for forecasting price movements in one
speculative market by the prior price movements of some
other speculative market.2 5
Generally, the output data of market systems
(I.e., market prices) are themselves important inputs
of markets.

As past and present prices are a significant

foundation for expected prices and as knowledge of present
prices and bids is antecedent to the calculation of one's
cashable wealth as an indication of one's capacity for
action as at a moment in time and as an indication of the
effectiveness of one's aotions through time, a significant
function of the securities market is to inform buyers
and sellers of the current structure of securities
prices.

But to regard the market simply as a device by

which buyers and sellers are. informed and actual exchanges
are effected would be to understate its functions and to
ignore its social character.
8.

Security Prices as Social Phenomena

Notice particularly that security prices are social .
phenomena arising from the interplay of the differing
25williams, ££. olt., pp. 39-^1
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expectations and valuations of all individuals partici
pating in the operation of the market.

Each individual,

in buying or not buying, in selling or not selling,
thereby contributes his share to the formation of the
market prices of securities.^

The larger the market,

in any case, the smaller is the weight of each individ
ual's contribution, the greater the effectiveness and
efficiency with which the market may be expected to
perform its associative and informative functions.
But always the forces determining the state of the market
in securities generally, the price structure of securi
ties at any instant, are the value judgments of individ
uals and their actions as directed by their current
expectations and preferences.

There is nothing inhuman

or mystical about the market for a specific security or
in securities generally.

The market process is entirely

and without exception a resultant of human choices and
2^Smith, 0£. olt., p. 129.
2?Though we speak of the market for a security as
Including all the individuals who entertain effective
inclinations to action in respect of a security and of
the market price of a security as the outcome of the
valuations of all investing persons, it will be clear
that the technical character of market organizations
places real restrictions upon the efficiency with which
the contributions of investors to price formation oan be
made. Hence, it may happen at certain times that prices
do not reflect the immediate inclinations of all persons.
During a sudden liquidation or immediately following
the receipt of startling news, for example, prices for
a few hours or a day may reflect a (technically)
restricted group of buyers and sellers. See Williams,
0£. cit., pp. 37-39.
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actions.2®

The market is a social body; market phenomena

are social phenomena, the resultant of each individual's
passive or active contribution.

But they are at one and

the same time different from each such contribution.
They appear to the Individual as something given, which
he himself cannot alter.

He therefore may not always

see himself as a significant, or even small, part of the
complex; of elements determining each momentary state of
the market.29

He may therefore feel himself free to

criticize "the market" or "Wall Street" or to speak of
"fair" prices, but these are absurd contradictions to the
concept of a. market.30
28«it is customary to speak metaphorically of the
automatic and anonymous forces actuating the 'mechanism'
of the market. In employing such metaphors people are
ready to disregard the fact that the only factors directing
the market and the determination of prices are purposive
acts of men. There is no automism; there are only men
consciously and deliberately aiming at ends chosen. There
are no mysterious mechanical forces; there is only the
human will to remove uneasiness.
There is no anonymity;
there is I and you and Bill and Joe and all the rest."
von Mises, ojd. cit., p. 315* "*The Market* is not a mys
terious entity in itself, rising and falling alone.
Its
price fluctuations result from the actions of a great many
human beings, motivated by their own personal knowledge,
emotions, and opinions."
Garfield A. Drew, New Methods
for Profit in the Stock Market (Boston: The Metcalf
Press, '194877 p. 169.
29von Mises, loc. cit.
3°"The concept of a 'Just* or 'fair' price is devoid
of any scientific meaning; it is a disguise for wishes, a
striving for a state of affairs different from reality.
Market prices are entirely determined by the value judg
ments of men as they really act." von Mises, 0£. cit.,
p. 332 . Magee ably dispels the myth of "the Street" and
"They" in John Magee, The
General Semantics of Wall
Street
(Springfield, Mass.: John
Magee, 1958 ), pp. 1 ^ 3 7 ^ 7
*32 f.

It follows from the social character of market phe
nomena that movements In specific prices, or in prices
generally, are not to be regarded as randomly generated:
In every case, the price and quantity of a dated trans
action in securities are the result of specific individ
uals preferring a to b at a given time and in a given
context, a strictly limited quantity of money to a
strictly limited number of securities and vice-versa.
Those who would suggest that securities prices fluctuate
randomly fail to understand one of the most significant
functions that securities markets perform: that of a
signalling device.

They fail to understand the homeo

static character of market systems.

For we have said

that when we speak of prices tending to rise or to fall,
we do not refer to an impersonal and automatic mechanism;
we refer to the responses of rational persons to stimuli
which include information concerning prevailing market
prices.

Such responses are not to be regarded as auto

matic ones.

They proceed from the (subjective) expecta

tions (and valuations) of thoughtful persons, based at
least in part upon imperfect information.

As choices are

directed towards the future and as there is always some
uncertainty regarding the future, there always exists the
possibility that expectations may be disappointed.

If and

insofar as those expectations which are the bases of
action in some interval are proved to have been in error
in succeeding intervals, the signals of the market may be
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supposed to induce canceling and corrective responses in
market participants.

On the market agitation never stops

as prices continually adjust to current expectations and
current valuations which are no less entirely anticipa
tory but which represent always the most current antici
pations and valuations of all Investing persons.

Any

market with its price mechanism may therefore be regarded
as a homeostatic device, continually restoring to con
sistency with actual conditions and events any price
which may have diverged from consistency through error
or mistaken expectations.

The viability of the market

system is thereby maintained.-^1
9.

Securities Prices and Management J

We have considered the corporation as an entity
operated in the interest of securityholders by managers.
It is frequently argued that the remoteness of individual
holders from the operations of complex corporations has
created a general independence of corporate

managements.

It is further argued that managements are therefore able
to free themselves of the pricing system of the securities
markets.

And this may perhaps be true, but only to the

extent that imperfect competition in the product or factor
markets of firms will allow.

For unless the performance

^ T h e classic study is Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and
Gardiner G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (New York: The Macmillan Company, 193271
32Chambers, op. cit., pp. 68-69; von Mises, op. olt.,
Chps. 15 and 16.

of a firm is consistent with the expectations of
securityholders, in the light of current conditions
and available alternatives, investors are fully able to
cast votes of no confidence in its management by
selling their securities (lowering offers and bids),
running down the market prices of its securities,
relative to those of similar firms, to a level consistent
with their new expectations and valuations.

In the case

of shares, other firms or corporate "raiders" may then
buy up the stock of the delinquent corporation, forcing
out the incumbent management of the latter; or, dis
appointed shareholders, often under zealous direction,
may exercise their formal, legal authority to control,
unseating the incumbent set of directors.

Or, dissident

shareholders may take legal action to liquidate the
corporation.

33

Bondholders may also sell their securi

ties in the market, running the price of a delinquent
firm’s bonds down and raising the costs at which the firm
can borrow.

And, if their interests are threatened, any

creditor of the firm, however small or unsecured, may
bring action against the corporation and, in seeking his
remedy, compel the forced liquidation of specific assets
or even bring about the collapse of flimsy corporations.
33»On April Pool's Day, 1932, a Mrs. Helen Samuels—
who held a mere $2,000 of stock in Insull Utility Invest
ments— quietly applied for the appointment of a receiver.
Within a few short weeks...thousands of American investors
had been ruined in the greatest financial failure in the
history of the world." Aylmer Vallance, Very Private
Enterprise (London: Thames and Hudson, 193577 p. i67.
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"There Is ample evidence of the effectiveness of these
remedies; the possibility that any one of them may occur,
to the personal detriment of the management group, Is a
check on disregard of the market."-'

That the check Is ,

operating Is attested to by the concern of managements
and directorates for the markets in the securities of
their firm and generally, a concern which is widely
observable.
3^chambers, o£. clt., p. 276.
35«»There seems to be considerable evidence that,
though the managements and directorates of corporations
are not directly under the overt scrutiny of stockholders
as a body in many respects they behave as if they were,
largely because of the richness of the interrelationships
in the market places of an interdependent society."
Chambers, loc. clt.; "...the manager and the capital
owner are each active in his own distinct sphere, but
their spheres of action are interrelated by virtue of
mutual orientation...the specifying and modifying
decisions of the manager presuppose and are consequent
upon the decisions of the capitalist.
If we like, we
may say that the latter*s decisions are of a ’higher
order.*" L. M. Laohmann, Capital and Its Structure
(London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd., 19^6), pp. 98-99.

CHAPTER VI
EPILOGUE
1.

Introduction

Tradition dictates that rigorous inquiry be
divisible into three parts.

In the first part one tells

what it is that he intends to say; in the second part, he
says it; and, in the third part, he tells what it is that
he has said.

This epilogue constitutes our third part.

In it we repeat all that we have said above; it will be
quite short.
2.

Arguments

We have argued!
1.

At any time the individual has a fired stock of

(net) cashable wealth which he considers eligible for
investment;
2.

The investment opportunities of persons are

represented by risky securities and (practically)
riskless (in money terms) cash;
3.

The investment choices of persons are made in

a given present in respect of an uncertain future;
All knowledge of the future and, therefore, of
the future consequences of investment choices is held
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with only a greater or lesser degree of probability;
5.

Investment choice and action are individual

and here and now, involving appraisement, the anticipa
tion of the expected consequences of available alterna
tive investments, and valuation, the preference of an
individual investor for the appraised consequences of
alternatives;
6.

The investment decisions of persons are made

relevant to a short period of time, or "investment
horizon;"
7.

The (net) ex post monetary gain or loss on an

investment is the (net) market price of the investment at
the end of the investment horizon plus (net) periodical
income (if any) from the investment over the horizon
minus the (gross) purchase price of the Investment;
8.

The subjective expectations (appraisements) of

persons concerning the (net) income and capital gain
prospects of alternative investments subsist as
n-parameter (subjective) probability distributions
over envisioned possible future events, ex ante monetary
gains and losses on alternative investments over
specified investment periods;
9.

The individual investor entertains probabilistic

appraisements for a finite set of alternative investments;
10.

The individual investor’s utility of wealth

^Solely for convenience, periodical income was
treated as accruing to the end of the investment period.
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function is generally of the form specified, by
Friedman-Savage2 and modified by

M a r k o w i t z

concave

(from below) for a relevant (initial) range of wealth
below the investor’s present wealth, convex over some
(initial) range of wealth above present wealth to a
level termed the individual’s "wealth aspiration," then
concave again, but bounded in the extremes; and
11.

The investor selects among alternative invest

ments so as to maximize his present valuation of net
expected utility.
3.

Inferences

It follows from arguments (1) through (11) that
the Individual investor’s valuations of alternative
Investments are determined as preferences for strictly
limited commitments in particular securities at current
(or appraised) prices.

The inclinations of investors

to take action in respect of given securities (to buy,
to sell, or to hold specific quantities at specific
prices) then have effect in the market.

They collectively

determine between more or less narrow margins the price
and quantity of each (dated) market transaction.
Whereas the differing valuations which give rise to
2Milton Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Utility
Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," Readings in Price
Theory (eds. George J. Stigler and Kenneth E. Boulding;
dhicagos Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1952), PP. 57-96.
3jlarry Markowitz, "The Utility of Wealth," Journal
of Political Economy. IX, No. 2 (April, 1952), 151-1^8.
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market participation are subjective and Intensive, the
market prices of securities derive from the interaction
of the Judgments of all participants in the market and
are objective and extensive measurements.

They measure

at a given time -and place the number of monetary units
which could have been substituted for a given quantity
of securities, and vice-versa.

(Dated) prices and

transaction volume alone constitute the corroborative
data of securities markets and require to be regarded
as the output of a "black box."
The inputs of the securities markets are informa
tional stimuli only variously received and vicariously
interpreted by market participants.

Important Inputs

through time of such markets are their output data: the
past and present prices of securities as indications of
future prices, as objective criteria by which the
effectiveness of past investment choices may be Judged,
and by reference to which investors may ascertain the
current monetary equivalents of their portfolios as
indications of their present capacities for action.
Finally and significantly, the market in securities
is a viable social body; security prices are social
phenomena.

The forces determining the state of the

market at any moment and thereby guiding the investment
choices of persons and the actions and policies of manage
ments are entirely the value Judgments of rational persons.
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Conclusion
Our aim has been the description of the essentially
subjective and rational process by which individuals make
Investment decisions and contribute to the determination
of securities prices which guide the aotions of manage
ments and the process of capital formation.

Our dis

cussion has proceeded largely at a general level, since
no explanation of the decision-making process of the
individual investor which is either very elaborate or
capable of being used for purposes of prediction is
possible.

This conclusion follows from the essential

subjectivity and impermanence of the expectations and
valuations which lie at the basis of the Investment
decisions of individuals.
The schedules and formulae we have found convenient
to construct and offer as generally descriptive of the
process by which those decisions are made are examples
of imaginary constructions useful in exposition.

There

is, however, no implication that investors construct
such schedules or manipulate even the simplest formulae
antecedent to their selections.
need not.

They may, but they

It is sufficient to our theory that they

reflect on the nature of uncertainty and on the
probabilistic character of all knowledge held in
contemplation of the future and of the future conse
quences of investment actions and that they hold
expectations of the potentials of alternative Investment
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commitments which they can evaluate in the light of their
various preferences or utilities for vicariously uncer
tain monetary prospects.
Generally, the process of individual investment
decision-making is neither chaotic nor limitlessly fluid.
The individual investor may change his estimates,
appraisements, and preferences from time to time, but
as a rule he does so only within broad limits.

The man

who has previously been interested in municipal bonds,
for example, is unlikely overnight to become a buyer of
penny stocks, nor the man previously interested in
highly speculative issues, a sudden devotee of utilities.
But if the individual Investor does not form reasoned
expectations of the potentials of alternative
securities and select among alternatives according to
his preferences, only by chance will he make choices
appropriate to them.
Finally, we have spoken of action and, in particular,
of Investment categories of action as individual in its
essential character.

It is not always the case, however,

that an individual acts for himself.

It is acknowledged

that associations comprised of the funds of numerous
individuals operate in the market for securities and that
investment counselors are at times contracted to manage

^James W. Angell, "Uncertainty, Likelihoods and
Investment Decisions," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
LXXIV, No. 1 (February, i960), 24-25.

an investor*s portfolio.

But Institutions do not act as

such; they act only through men.^

Their singular differ

entiation is in respect of the vast accumulations of
wealth they are able to achieve.
are likewise deliberative men.

Investment counselors
That they deliberate and

act as agents for Investing principals requires that they
function in the interest of one whose ends they may know
only secondarily.

They may seek in their function to

predict the optimal adaptive decisions of their prin
cipals, but they function as men.

By agreement, their

choice is the choice, their actions are the actions, of
their principals.
^"The hangman, not the state, executes a criminal."
Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (3d rev. ed.; Chicago:
Henry Hegnery Company, l£66), p. kz.
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